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Abstract 
 
We show that firms with younger CEOs are more likely to experience stock price crashes, 
including crashes caused by revelation of negative news in the form of breaks in strings of 
consecutive earnings increases. Such strings are accompanied by large increases in CEO 
compensation that do not dissipate with crashes. These findings suggest that CEOs have financial 
incentives to hoard bad news earlier in their career, which increases future crashes. This negative 
impact of CEO age effect is strongest in the presence of managerial discretion. Overall, the 
findings highlight the importance of CEO age for firm policies and outcomes. 
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1. Introduction 
A considerable body of literature suggests that managers might hide bad operating 
performance news from investors when faced with adverse outcomes that affect negatively their 
personal wealth (Bliss and Rosen, 2001; Gibbons and Murphy, 1992). However, if managers 
withhold and accumulate negative information for an extended period, this eventually leads to 
bad news stockpiling within the firm and to severe stock overvaluation. When stockpiling 
reaches a critical threshold level, it becomes too costly for managers or even impossible to 
continue withholding the accumulated negative information (Baik et al., 2011). When revealed at 
one time in the market, the bad news will lead to a substantial revision of investors’ expectations 
about the future prospects of the firm and, inevitably, to a stock price crash (Jin and Myers, 
2006).  
The literature generally ascribes stock price crashes to the failure of corporate governance 
control systems to alleviate agency problems (Andreou et al., 2016; Callen and Fang, 2013; 
Hutton et al., 2009; Kim et al., 2011a; Kim and Zhang, 2016). Despite this conceptual interest on 
agency problems, this literature focuses on firm attributes and ignores agency problems that 
relate to CEO characteristics. In this study, we suggest that pay-performance sensitivity creates 
incentives for bad news hoarding. The incentives vary with CEO age and become a source of 
agency problems that leads to the prediction that firms managed by younger CEOs are more 
likely to experience stock price crashes. 
The study draws motivation from prior literature suggesting that CEOs are highly 
concerned about firm performance because performance directly affects their current and future 
personal wealth through executive compensation packages (Bliss and Rosen, 2001; Gibbons and 
Murphy, 1992; Petrou and Procopiou, 2016). Thus, when the actions of CEOs fail to deliver, 
concerns about their personal wealth can incentivize them to conceal adverse operating outcomes 
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from shareholders. However, the pay-performance sensitivity of CEOs varies with CEO age. 
Younger CEOs could secure significant permanent increases in compensation early in their 
career, which they can enjoy for a longer period. Accordingly, younger CEOs might have more 
financial incentives to intentionally conceal and accumulate adverse operating outcomes from 
investors, increasing in this respect the probability of experiencing a stock price crash in the 
future.  
We test these predictions using ExecuComp firms for the period 1995-2013. We measure 
firm-specific stock price crashes as the presence of an extreme negative firm-specific weekly 
return (Hutton et al., 2009; Kim et al., 2011a). Controlling for other known determinants of stock 
price crashes, the results show that firms managed by younger CEOs are more likely to 
experience a stock price crash. To investigate the mechanism underpinning this relationship, that 
is, the hoarding of bad news, we focus on stock price crashes triggered by earnings 
announcements that break previous years’ strings of consecutive earnings increases. Myers et al. 
(2007) suggest that breaks in strings of consecutive earnings increases emanate from stockpiling 
of negative news, particularly when the break occurs after a longer string. Thus, breaks in 
earnings strings that trigger stock price crashes is a manifestation of agency risk pertaining to the 
practice of bad news hoarding. In addition, the severity of agency risk is positively related to the 
length of the string. Using these crashes, we still find that firms managed by younger CEOs are 
more likely to experience a stock price crash, ascertaining that the mechanism of stockpiling of 
negative information pertaining to adverse operating performance drive this relationship. In 
corroboration, we find that the length of the string prior to the break is more strongly associated 
with crashes when a younger CEO leads the company. Next, we investigate CEOs’ pay-
performance incentives by focusing on the evolution of CEO compensation before (up to 3 
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years), during, and after (up to 1 year) stock price crashes. Controlling for known determinants 
of CEO compensation, the results demonstrate large increases in CEO compensation in periods 
of consecutive earnings increases. Interestingly, CEO compensation does not revert to previous 
levels during and after the crash. These findings imply that CEOs have strong financial 
incentives to generate strings of consecutive earnings increases earlier in their career, resulting in 
a CEO agency problem that drives stock price crashes.  
To prevent moral hazard situations, agency theory identifies the board’s monitoring role, 
among others, as a critical control system (Eisenhardt, 1989). Accordingly, we examine two 
organizational factors which compromise board monitoring and increase managerial discretion, 
namely, the CEO duality in the governance structure (Dalton et al., 1998; Jensen, 1993) and the 
degree of corporate diversification (Martin and Sayrak, 2003; Ndofor et al., 2013). Our results 
show that these two factors strengthen the relationship between younger CEOs and future crash 
risk. This finding raises important considerations for the competence of the board to effectively 
monitor and control self-interested young CEOs.  
Our results are robust to alternative measures of stock price crash risk, such as the 
negative coefficient of skewness of firm-specific weekly returns (Chen et al., 2001) and the 
negative of the worst deviation of firm-specific weekly return (Bradshaw et al., 2010). In 
addition, the results are robust to potential model misspecifications. Specifically, a propensity 
score-matching analysis ensures that the CEO age effect is not driven by differences between 
firms managed by younger or older CEOs among observable: (i) firm characteristics, such as 
firm size, growth, leverage, profitability, performance, and age, and (ii) CEO characteristics, for 
instance tenure, turnover, retirement, in the money option holdings and equity holdings. 
We also consider a variety of alternative explanations. First, a reverse relationship 
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running from crash risk to CEO age is likely to exist under two conditions: (i) stock price crash 
risk relates to CEO turnover and firms hire younger CEOs, and (ii) stock price crash risk exhibits 
persistence. However, we find no statistically significant difference in the age of newly hired 
CEOs for firms that experience a stock price crash relative to firms that do not. In addition, after 
examining firms that exhibit more difficulties in handling risk or inherently risky firms, which 
may require more healthy, flexible and energetic young CEOs, we find no evidence that the age 
of newly hired CEOs is significantly different among firms that experience a stock price crash 
and firms that do not. Hence, crash risk is unlikely to relate to the age of newly hired CEOs. 
Lastly, as a complementary test of the reverse causality explanation, we re-run the main analysis 
and find qualitatively similar results after excluding the first three years of CEO tenure, which 
are affected more by persistence in crash risk, and thus potentially may cause a reverse 
relationship. 
Second, physiological and psychological characteristics of the CEO and heterogeneous 
abilities change with age, and some of these characteristics might provoke stock price crashes. 
Such characteristics include the effects of ability, power, overconfidence, youthful creativeness, 
and inexperience with corporate communications. Controlling for CEO demonstrated ability, 
power, and overconfidence, the results remain unaltered. Youthful creativeness and inexperience 
with corporate communication are more problematic to control directly because it is difficult to 
measure them precisely; nevertheless, we can observe their consequences, and hence, we can 
design appropriate tests to examine their merit as alternative explanations of the CEO age effect. 
More specifically, youthful creativeness associated with younger CEOs experimenting with 
novel strategies should predict fat tails generally, not only one-sided exposure to crashes. In 
contrast to such an explanation, we find no relationship between CEO age and the probability of 
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a positive jump in the firm-specific weekly returns. Thus, CEO age appears to predict only 
negative jumps, i.e., stock price crashes. Similarly, inexperience of younger CEOs in corporate 
communication could lead them to portray optimistic earnings expectations to analysts. In 
response, younger CEOs might hoard bad news to meet or beat analyst earnings forecasts, 
increasing in this respect future stock price crash risk. Excluding crashes that likely result from 
setting inappropriate earnings expectations from the main analysis does not affect the CEO age 
effect.  
Finally, we examine the possibility that the CEO age effect reflects unobservable habitual 
CEO characteristics (Graham et al., 2012) that affect disproportionately younger CEOs. 
Specifically, such characteristics can have implications for stock price crashes and can lead to 
CEO turnover, particularly younger CEOs who are less reputable, creating a sample selection 
bias that affects mostly younger CEOs. Nevertheless, this explanation does not gain support 
because we still find CEO age effect for the subsample of firms with CEOs that avoid turnover 
for at least 5 years. In this subsample, habitual CEO characteristics should affect a firm’s crash 
risk similarly over a long period.  
This study contributes to the literature on stock price crashes by showing that 
compensation incentives create CEO-level variation in agency problems that increase the 
likelihood of firms with younger CEOs to experience future stock price crashes due to hoarding 
of bad news. Prior literature finds that crash risk relates to accounting opacity (Hutton et al., 
2009), tax avoidance (Kim et al., 2011b), accounting conservatism (Kim and Zhang, 2016), 
equity-based compensation (Kim et al., 2011a) and inefficient governance (Andreou et al., 2016; 
Callen and Fang, 2013). However, what motivates managers to conceal bad news largely 
remained unexplored in the literature. This study’s main contribution fills this gap by providing 
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novel evidence that CEOs have financial incentives to pursue bad news hoarding activities 
earlier in their career, which subsequently lead to stock price crashes. 
In addition, the study contributes to the emerging literature that links heterogeneous CEO 
characteristics to firm policies and outcomes (Bertrand and Schoar, 2003). In this vein, recent 
studies find that CEO age significantly affects corporate investments. For instance, Yim (2013) 
finds that financial incentives motivate younger CEOs to make more acquisitions, whereas 
Serfling (2014) provides evidence that older CEOs invest less in research and development, 
make more diversifying acquisitions and maintain lower operating leverage, resulting in lower 
firm risk. Our perspective is different and links CEO age to future stock price crashes. This 
perspective has important implications for corporate governance policies by raising concerns 
about the role of boards in monitoring and incentivizing CEOs. Specifically, the findings of our 
study should probe boards to devise appropriate governance mechanisms that combat agency 
problems that emerge from CEO age. 
The rest of the study is organized as follows. Section 2 develops our hypotheses and 
outlines the testable predictions. Section 3 describes the research design. Section 4 presents the 
empirical results. Section 5 presents the robustness analysis results. Section 6 presents results on 
alternative explanations of the findings. Finally, section 7 concludes the study. 
 
2. Hypotheses Development 
2.1. CEO AGE AND CRASH RISK  
Gibbons and Murphy (1992) argue that the ‘labor market uses a worker’s current output 
to update its belief about the worker’s ability and then base future wages on these updated 
beliefs’. Accordingly, superior performance affects a manager’s value in the labor market and 
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results in future compensation increases. Because of that relationship, younger CEOs should 
have strong financial incentives to deliver superior (or to hide poor) performance to gain early 
rises in compensation, which they will enjoy for a longer period. Consistent with this argument, 
Yim (2013) finds that younger CEOs are more likely to pursue acquisitions and that CEOs are 
rewarded as much as $300,000 in additional annual compensation for each sizable acquisition 
they make. Similarly, Boschen et al. (2003) show that excess performance has a positive effect 
on the cumulative financial gain of CEOs. Such evidence suggests that younger CEOs might be 
more sensitive about firm performance and that similar performance achievements have more 
wealth related value for younger CEOs. 
Drawing on agency theory (Jensen and Meckling, 1976), we suggest that different levels 
of CEO pay for performance sensitivity, which depend upon CEOs’ ages, should create different 
responses to adverse operating outcomes. For instance, disclosure of negative information about 
performance should harm the personal wealth of younger CEOs more because the labor market 
will use this information to update beliefs about their abilities and set a corresponding (lower) 
level of compensation (Gibbons and Murphy, 1992), which, when accumulated across a CEO’s 
career, is more costly for younger CEOs. Therefore, these CEOs have more incentives to hide 
negative information to avoid personal wealth consequences, hoping that poor current 
performance will be offset by stronger future performance. Hiding and accumulating bad news, 
however, is unsustainable in the long run; eventually, bad news will spill out in the market when 
strong future performance does not materialize (Bleck and Liu, 2007; Jin and Myers, 2006). 
Investors’ response to unexpected bad news is fierce, leading to an abrupt downward revision of 
their expectations about the firm’s long-term prospects, which triggers a stock price crash 
(Callen and Fang, 2015; Jin and Myers, 2006). The abovementioned discussion leads us to the 
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following hypothesis: 
 
Hypothesis 1. Firms managed by younger CEOs are associated with higher levels of future stock 
price crash risk. 
 
2.2 THE MODERATING EFFECT OF MANAGEMENT DISCRETION 
CEOs are more prone to engage in moral hazard situations when they have discretion, 
which they might use to compromise the effectiveness of the boards’ monitoring function 
(Finkelstein and Hambrick, 1989; Ocasio, 1994). Such opportunities emerge in the presence of 
two organizational characteristics: the existence of CEO duality in the governance structure and 
the degree of corporate diversification. 
A CEO-Chair can acquire significant influence over the board, thereby weakening the 
board’s ability to effectively monitor and control management decisions (Dalton et al., 1998; 
Hambrick and Finkelstein, 1987; Jensen, 1993). This influence can be achieved in a number of 
ways. First, CEO-Chairs, who nominate board directors, can select directors who are loyal to 
them (Westphal and Zajac, 1995). Second, the duality structure can enable CEOs to root 
themselves in the organization by creating norms of not questioning management effectiveness 
(Finkelstein and D'aveni, 1994). Finally, these CEOs might control the board’s distribution of 
attention to organizational matters, purposely discouraging adequate attention to monitoring 
(Tuggle et al., 2010). Consequently, when the CEO-Chair position is held by younger CEOs who 
are more sensitive to adverse changes in firm performance, it is more likely to suppress the 
board’s monitoring function to facilitate hoarding of bad news from shareholders. Effectively, 
such behavior makes firms more prone to future stock price crash risk. Consequently, we expect 
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that: 
 
Hypothesis 2. The relationship between CEO age and future stock price crash risk is stronger in 
the presence of a CEO-Chair position.  
 
Likewise, in diversified firms, there is greater organizational complexity, which can 
compromise in many ways the effectiveness of board monitoring (Martin and Sayrak, 2003; 
McKendall and Wagner, 1997; Ndofor et al., 2013). First, due to decentralized controls 
embedded in diversified firms, management decisions are based on information originating from 
multiple units operating in different segments. This makes the verification and the assessment of 
management decisions by board members more difficult. Second, in such complex 
organizational setting the correctness of the CEO’s judgment is difficult to challenge because 
people in that position are expected to have the most knowledge and information about the 
subject of the decision. Finally, CEOs have the chance to control what information is disclosed, 
in particular, information relating to the efficiency of their actions. Consequently, such 
deficiencies limit investors’ capacity to collect and interpret important information, which in turn 
can impede material input from being timely incorporated into ﬁrm valuations (Cohen and Lou, 
2012). Because of that, younger CEOs in the presence of organizational complexity are more 
likely to hide bad news relating to poor performance from shareholders, which increases the 
probability of a stock price crash. Consequently, we expect that: 
  
Hypothesis 3. The relationship between CEO age and future stock price crash risk is stronger in 
more-highly diversified firms. 
12 
 
3. Research Design 
3.1 SAMPLE 
To construct our sample, we use several data sources. First, we estimate crash risk 
measures using firms listed in the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP). Similar to 
earlier research, we exclude financial service firms (SIC 6000-6999) and utilities (SIC 4900-
4999) because the financial characteristics in these industries are not the same as in other 
industries (Kim et al., 2011a). In addition, we exclude firm-years with a stock price less than 
$2.5 at the end of the fiscal year and firm-years with fewer than 26 weeks of stock returns in a 
fiscal year (Hutton et al., 2009). For the remaining firms, we gather CEO-related information 
from ExecuComp. We also collect firm-related information from Industrial Segment and 
Compustat Industrial Annual databases. The final sample with complete information covers the 
period 1995-2013 and consists of 18,649 firm-year observations, which correspond to 2,255 
firms from various industries.  
 
3.2 DEPENDENT VARIABLES 
Because the aim of this study is to investigate the effect of CEO age on stock price 
crashes, we first estimate firm-specific weekly returns using the following index model 
regression: 
tjtmjtmjtmjtmjtmjjtj rrrrrr ,2,,51,,4,,31,,22,,1,     (1)
 
where tjr ,  is the return on stock j in week t, and tmr ,  is the CRSP value-weighted market index in 
week t. Consistent with Dimson (1979), we include lead and lag variables for the market index to 
allow for non-synchronous trading. This regression is useful to separate firm returns into two 
components: (i) returns due to market-wide movements, as measured by the fitted value of the 
13 
 
regression; and (ii) firm-specific returns as captured by the residuals of the regression. Our focus 
is on the residuals of the regression. Following the literature, we define the firm-specific weekly 
returns for firm j in week t ( tjW , ) as the natural logarithm of 1 plus the residual (i.e., 
]1ln[ ,, tjtjW  ). This approach is necessary because the residuals of the regression are skewed. 
We use the residuals to estimate three measures of crash risk. The primary measure is a binary 
variable that equals 1 when a firm experiences at least one crash week during the fiscal year, and 
zero otherwise (CRASH). A crash week is identified when the firm-specific weekly return is 3.2 
standard deviations below the average firm-specific weekly returns for the entire fiscal year (3.2 
is chosen to generate a frequency of 0.1% in the normal distribution).
1
  
As an alternative measure of crash risk, we also employ the negative coefficient of 
skewness (NCSKEW), which equals the negative of the third moment of firm-specific weekly 
returns for each firm in a year divided by the standard deviation of firm-specific weekly returns 
raised to the third power (Chen et al., 2001). Specifically, for a given firm in a fiscal year, we 
calculate NCSKEW as follows:  
2
3
2
,
3
,
2
3
, )])(2)(1/[()1([   tjtjtj WnnWnnNCSKEW . (2) 
The third measure of crash risk is the extreme sigma (EXTR_SIGMA). EXTR_SIGMA is 
the negative of the worst deviation of firm-specific weekly returns from the average firm-specific 
weekly return divided by the standard deviation of firm-specific weekly returns (Bradshaw et al., 
2010). In particular, for a given firm in a fiscal year, we compute EXTR_SIGMA as follows: 
],[_
,
,
,
tjW
ttj
tj
WW
MinSIGMAEXTR



 (3)
 
                         
1
 Similar to Kim et al. (2011a), we use 3.2 standard deviations below the average firm-specific weekly returns of the 
entire fiscal year as a reasonable benchmark to define extremely negative returns. Our findings are qualitatively 
similar using alternative benchmarks, such as 3.09 standard deviations below the average firm-specific weekly 
returns of the entire fiscal year (Hutton et al., 2009). 
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where W is the mean of the firm-specific weekly return and W  
is the standard deviation of the 
firm-specific weekly return.  
 For both NCSKEW and EXTR_SIGMA, larger values signify greater crash risk.  
 
3.3 MAIN EXPLANATORY VARIABLES 
Our main explanatory variable is the CEO age (AGEt-1).
2
 In addition, we measure CEO 
duality (DUALITYt-1) using a binary variable which equals 1 when the positions of CEO and 
Chairman are held by the same person, and zero otherwise (Davidson et al., 2004). Furthermore, 
a firm’s degree of diversification is measured using a sales-based Herfindahl Index 
(HERFINDAHLt-1). A smaller Herfindahl index indicates a greater degree of firm diversification.  
 
3.4 CONTROL VARIABLES 
We use a set of control variables that are deemed potential predictors of stock price crash 
risk. These variables include CEO characteristics, firm characteristics, investor characteristics, 
and industry/year effects. Concerning CEO characteristics, we control for CEO firm-specific 
experience (Hambrick and Fukutomi, 1991) using CEO tenure (TENUREt-1). Uncertainty 
concerning the ability of short-tenured CEOs to lead the firm due to deficient firm-specific 
knowledge and experience (Simsek, 2007) creates pressure for such CEOs to defend their job, 
for instance by hiding bad news. In that case, tenure should be inversely related to future stock 
price crashes. We measure CEO tenure using the natural logarithm of the number of years in a 
CEO post with a particular company (Henderson et al., 2006). We also control for departing 
CEOs who might overstate earnings, using two binary variables that equal 1 when there is a 
                         
2
 Note that in our regression tests, all of the explanatory/control variables are measured during the period t-1 with 
respect to the crash risk. Thus, we model the probability of a stock price crash given all information at time t-1. In 
this respect, we require that the CEO remains in the position during the period from t-1 to t. 
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change in a firm’s CEO in either the leading 1 or 2 years, respectively, and zero otherwise 
(CEO_CHANGEt-1 and CEO_CHANGEt-2). Overstatement of earnings could be more severe 
when the CEO change is known ex-ante, as in the case of CEO retirements (Ali and Zhang, 
2015). Accordingly, we additionally control for CEO retirement using a binary variable that 
equals 1 when the CEO age is close to retirement (e.g., CEO age is 64-65 years), and zero 
otherwise (RETIREMENTt-1). Generally, during periods of CEO departures, it is possible that 
CEOs use accounting and/or investment decisions to increase performance-based compensation 
in their final years at the expense of future earnings or to cover up the firm’s deteriorating 
performance that threatens their position (Murphy and Zimmerman, 1993). Both decisions might 
lead to a stock price crash during either the pre- or the post-CEO departure period, depending 
upon when bad news is revealed in the market.
3
 Finally, we control for CEO equity-based 
compensation using the intrinsic value of the vested and unvested in-the-money options held by 
CEOs (ITM_OPTION_HOLDINGSt-1) and CEO equity holdings (EQUITY_HOLDINGSt-1) 
using the natural logarithm of the market value of shares held by CEOs.
4
 Kim et al., (2011a) find 
that equity incentives relate positively to the firm’s future stock price crash risk.  
Concerning firm characteristics, following Chen et al. (2001) and Hutton et al. (2009), we 
include standard control variables such as past firm size, defined as the natural logarithm of the 
market value of equity (Log(SIZEt-1)); firm growth (MBt-1), defined as the ratio of the market 
value to the book value of equity; firm leverage (LEVt-1), defined as the firm’s total liabilities 
scaled by total assets; and firm operating performance, defined as income before extraordinary 
items to equity (ROEt-1). Small, high growth, highly leveraged and less-profitable firms are 
                         
3
 If the reason for CEO departure is poor performance and firms hire younger CEOs, then assuming persistence in 
crash risk, CEO changes could induce a spurious CEO age effect on stock price crashes. In section 6, we explicitly 
test this alternative explanation and show that it does not affect our findings.    
4
 According to Efendi et al. (2007), intrinsic holding values capture information on both possible equity 
overvaluation and price sensitivity.   
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expected to exhibit more stock price crashes. Also, Chen et al. (2001) find that firms with high 
past returns are more prone to crash. Therefore, we control for past firm financial performance 
using the average firm-specific weekly returns (RETURNt-1). In addition, we control for firm age 
using the number of years that the firm is covered in COMPUSTAT (FIRM_AGEt-1). More-
experienced firms should be better at handling risk than less experienced firms. Thus, firm age 
should negatively relate to stock price crashes. Furthermore, we control for the firms’ operational 
opacity using goodwill to total assets (GOODWILLt-1), research and development to total assets 
(R&Dt-1) and a binary variable that equals 1 when the firm belongs to the technology industry 
(TECHNOLOGYt-1).
5
 According to Jin and Myers (2006), opaque firms are more likely to crash. 
Finally, we control for the firm’s degree of competitiveness (COMPETITIVENESSt-1) using the 
Lerner index, measured as industry-adjusted firm operating profit to sales, and default risk 
(PR_DEFAULTt-1), using Merton (1974) probability-to-default model as in Andreou (2015). 
Pressure to deliver performance and inherent riskiness that characterizes such firms’ operations 
can make them more prone to crash.  
Concerning investor characteristics, we control for investor heterogeneity or the 
difference of opinions among investors using the de-trended average weekly stock trading 
volume (DTURNt-1). Chen et al. (2001) find that firms with high turnover are more likely to 
crash in the future. 
In the regression, we also include industry effects to cover for idiosyncratic differences 
between industries that can make it easier/more difficult for managers to hide bad news 
(Finkelstein and Hambrick, 1989). We control for industry fixed effects by including industry 
binary variables, using the 48-industry classification suggested by Fama and French (1997). 
                         
5
 Technology industry is defined by the following 4-digit SIC codes:  2833-2836 (drugs), 3570-3577 (computers), 
3600-3674 (electronics), 3810-3845 (precise measurement instruments), 7371-7379 (programming) and 8731-8734 
(R&D services). 
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Similarly, we include year fixed effects to control for the unobserved year characteristics omitted 
from the analysis. Finally, as a mean of addressing concerns about dynamic endogeneity, we use 
past values of the dependent variable in our regressions. Given that crash risk is a binary 
variable, we use a continuous variable, the negative coefficient of skewness (NCSKEWt-1).
6
 
 
4. Empirical Results 
4.1 SUMMARY STATISTICS 
Table I presents yearly information about the incidence and magnitude of crashes. Based 
on the definition of crashes, and assuming that firm-specific returns are normally distributed, we 
would expect to observe 0.1% of the firms crashing in any week. Accordingly, the likelihood of 
a crash during a year would be 1 - (1 - 0.001)
52
 = 5.07%. Interestingly, consistent with Kim et al. 
(2011a) and Hutton et al. (2009), it seems that crashes are more prevalent than would have been 
expected under normality of firm-specific returns. In particular, the sample consists of 18,649 
firm-year observations, of which 3,573 firm-years or 19.16% are classified as crashes. This 
finding is in line with prior evidence that show that simple returns are not normal but exhibit 
negative skewness (Chen et al., 2001; Harvey and Siddique, 2000; Theodossiou, 2015). Finally, 
the average weekly return of crashes throughout the period of investigation is substantial and 
equals -18%. Both the prevalence and the magnitude of the crashes indicate that stock price 
crashes are events with substantial consequences for the shareholders of a firm.  
[Insert Table I about here] 
Table II displays descriptive statistics. The average CEO age is 55.04 years. In addition, 
the 25
th
 and 75
th
 percentiles are 50 and 60 years, respectively, implying that there is sufficient 
variation in CEO age to investigate the effect of CEO age on stock price crash risk. Concerning 
                         
6
 Appendix describes all the variables used in the analysis. 
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the moderator variables, 57.80% of the firm-year observations consist of CEOs who also serve as 
Chairman of the board; the average Herfindahl index is approximately 0.81.
7
  
[Insert Table II about here] 
 
4.2 CEO AGE AND CRASHES  
To investigate our hypotheses, we begin by plotting in Fig. 1 the percentage of stock 
price crashes across firm-years based on CEO age quartiles. CEOs with age less than 51 are 
included in the youngest age cohort (AGE_GROUP_I). CEOs with ages between 51 and 55 (56 
and 60) are included in AGE_GROUP_II (AGE_GROUP_III) while CEOs with age greater than 
60 are included in the oldest age cohort (AGE_GROUP_IV). The percentage of stock price 
crashes in AGE_GROUP_I is 20.60% and declines monotonically to 17.10% in 
AGE_GROUP_IV.
 
In addition, a Chi Square test indicates that the percentage of stock price 
crashes in AGE_GROUP_I and AGE_GROUP_II are statistically significantly different 
compared to crashes in AGE_GROUP_IV. Finally, relative to the unconditional average of stock 
price crashes, which equals 19.16%, firms managed by CEOs that belong in the youngest 
(oldest) age cohort exhibit 7.51% (10.75%) greater (lower) likelihood of a stock price crash.  
[Insert Figure 1 about here] 
To formalize this evidence in a multivariate setting, we employ a logit regression 
analysis. The dependent variable is the stock price crash in year t, whereas the main explanatory 
variable is the CEO age in year t-1. In addition, the regression includes control variables for CEO 
characteristics, firm characteristics, investor characteristics, and industry/year fixed effects. All 
of the continuous explanatory variables are standardized to have a mean of 0 and standard 
                         
7
 Untabulated correlation analysis reveals that most variables, including CEO age, correlate with stock price crashes 
and exhibit the expected sign. None of the cross correlations is sufficiently high to raise concerns over 
multicollinearity. 
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deviation of 1. Such standardization is useful to avoid potential influences attributed to scaling 
differences.
8
 Furthermore, to ease interpretation of the results, the models report odds ratios, that 
is, the exponential of each coefficient estimate. When all other variables are held constant, an 
odds ratio that equals 1 indicates no relationship between the variable and crash risk. In contrast, 
an odds ratio greater (less) than 1 shows how much the probability of a crash risk increases 
(decreases). In addition, given that our data include multiple observations for the same firm, we 
use a clustering procedure that accounts for potential within-firm dependence to prevent biased 
standard error estimates that can arise when the residuals of a firm are correlated over time.  
Consistent with Hypothesis 1, the results in model 2 of Table III show that firms 
employing younger CEOs are more likely to experience a future stock price crash. In terms of 
economic importance, one standardized unit decrease of CEO age increases the probability of a 
stock price crash by approximately 7.60% (p<0.01). In model 3, we present the effect of CEO 
age utilizing binary variables based on the quartile groupings of age (AGE_GROUP_I < 51, 
AGE_GROUP_II = 51-55, AGE_GROUP_III = 56-60, omitted AGE_GROUP_IV > 61). The 
coefficient estimates are greater than one and decline monotonically across the CEO age groups, 
suggesting that the probability of a stock price crash for the younger CEO groups is increasing 
relative to older CEO groups. In model 4, we present the effect of age in an alternative way, 
which is relevant for subsequent analysis in section 5, using a binary variable that equals 1 if the 
CEO age is less than the median value (YOUNG_CEO). The coefficient estimate shows that 
firms managed by young CEOs exhibit approximately 11.20% greater probability of a stock 
price crash (p<0.05) relative to older CEOs.  
[Insert Table III about here] 
Turning next to the control variables, the results in model 1 show that most variables 
                         
8
 Nevertheless, note that the results are robust to using unstandardized variables. 
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affect the probability of a stock price crash significantly. Specifically, concerning CEO-
characteristics, CEO tenure decreases the probability of crash risk (p<0.10) in line with the view 
that pressure to deliver performance incentivizes short-tenured CEOs to defend their jobs using 
methods that induce future crashes. Furthermore, the results show that changes in a firm’s CEO 
in either the leading 1 or 2 years are positively related to crashes (p<0.01 and p<0.01, 
respectively), suggesting that CEOs overstate earnings when they are close to a change. In 
addition, consistent with Kim et al. (2011a), in-the-money options increase the probability of 
crashes (p<0.01), indicating that stock options can motivate managers to hide bad news to 
increase stock option benefits. Concerning firm characteristics, firm size decreases the 
probability of crashes (p<0.01), whereas firm performance, goodwill and the competitive status 
of the firm increase the probability of crashes (p<0.10, p<0.01 and p<0.01, respectively). 
Consistent with these results, Chen et al. (2001) also find that past firm performance relates 
positively to stock price crashes. Similarly, Jin and Myers (2006) show that opaque stocks are 
more likely to crash. Concerning investor characteristics, investor heterogeneity increases the 
likelihood of crash risk (p<0.01), consistent with the view that investor heterogeneity and short-
sale constraints prevent bearish investors from participating in the market, leading to overvalued 
equity and subsequent stock price crashes (Hong and Stein, 2003). Finally, past negative 
conditional skewness increases the likelihood of crash risk (p<0.01).  
 
4.3 CEO AGE AND CRASHES: THE ROLE OF BAD NEWS HOARDING  
According to our perspective, the mechanism underpinning the relationship between 
CEO age and stock price crashes is the hoarding of bad news. In this section, we investigate 
explicitly this idea by focusing on stock price crashes triggered by company earnings 
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announcements that break previous years’ strings of consecutive earnings increases. Myers et al. 
(2007) suggest that strings of consecutive earnings increases, particularly longer strings, can 
result from hoarding of bad news. Therefore, a break in strings that triggers a stock price crash 
represents an ideal setting to investigate explicitly whether bad news hoarding drives the 
relationship between the CEO age and stock price crashes.  
Consistent with this idea, we redefine crashes as follows: (i) 
CRASH_BREAK_STRING1 equal to one if a firm experiences a stock price crash and firm 
earnings decreased in the current year but increased in the previous year, and zero otherwise; (ii) 
CRASH_BREAK_STRING2 equal to one if a firm experiences a stock price crash and firm 
earnings decreased in the current year but increased in the previous two years, and zero 
otherwise; and (iii) CRASH_BREAK_STRING3 equal to one if a firm experiences a stock price 
crash and firm earnings decreased in the current year but increased in the previous three years, 
and zero otherwise. We expect that stock price crashes that associate with 
CRASH_BREAK_STRING1, CRASH_BREAK_STRING2 and CRASH_BREAK_STRING3 
are more likely to result from stockpiling of negative news, and this likelihood might increase 
with the length of the string. Among 3,573 stock price crashes, as exhibited in Table I, 1,055 
crashes or 29.53% are triggered by firm earnings that decreased in the current year but increased 
in the previous year, 710 crashes or 19.87% are triggered by firm earnings that decreased in the 
current year but increased in the previous two years, and 411 crashes or 11.50% are triggered by 
firm earnings that decreased in the current year but increased in the previous three years. These 
statistics indicate that breaks in strings of consecutive earnings increases represent an important 
source of crashes. Using these alternative definitions of crashes as dependent variables, we re-
estimate model 2 of Table III after controlling for the length of the earnings string prior to the 
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break (LEN_STRINGt-1).
9
 The results in models 1, 3, and 5 of Table IV continue to show that 
one standardized unit decrease of CEO age increases the probability of a stock price crash 
triggered by a break in string of positive earnings increases by 10.80% (p<0.01), 8.10% (p<0.01) 
and 14.70% (p<0.01), respectively. Furthermore, as expected, in Models 1, 3, and 5 one 
standardized unit increase in the length of a string increases the probability of a stock price crash 
triggered by a break in string of consecutive earnings increases by 52.40% (p<0.01), 96.40% 
(p<0.01), and 143.50% (p<0.01), respectively. To link these two results, we interact CEO age 
with the length of the string. To the extent that the length of the string, ex-ante, proxies for bad 
news hoarding and that a break in a string represents the revelation of bad news that trigger 
crashes, based on our theoretical perspective, CEO age should moderate the relationship between 
strings and crashes. Indeed, the results in models 2, 4, and 6 show that the relationship between 
the length of the string and the probability of a stock price crash triggered by a break in strings is 
more positive for younger CEOs. Note that this moderating effect is becoming more important 
and significant in (i) model 4 relative to model 2 (the coefficient estimate is 0.878 (p<0.01) and 
0.935 (p<0.05), respectively) and (ii) model 6 relative to model 4 (the coefficient estimate is 
0.834 (p<0.01) and 0.878 (p<0.01), respectively). Accordingly, assuming that stock price crashes 
in models 2, 4, and 6 represent, in an increasing manner, the outcome from revelation of bad 
news hoarding, these results imply that earnings strings are much more likely to represent 
stockpiling of negative news when firms are managed by younger CEOs. Finally, Hoetker (2007) 
suggests that when interpreting interaction terms, it is important to consider not only the 
coefficient estimates of interaction terms but also the coefficients of each interacted variable and 
the values of all of the other variables. Therefore, to reinforce our interpretation, we plot in 
                         
9
 Strings of consecutive earnings increases are quite prevalent and endure in our sample. Specifically, the sample 
comprises 4,093 unique strings that exhibit an average duration of 2.76 years. 
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Figure 2 the estimated moderating effect of CEO age on the relationship between the length of 
the earnings string and the likelihood of stock price crashes using model 6 of Table IV.
10
 
Consistent with our previous interpretation, the plot shows that the positive effect of the length of 
the string on the probability of a stock price crash caused by a break is stronger for young than 
old CEOs. To further examine this moderation effect, we also use the Johnson-Neyman 
technique to estimate the region of significance, which provides values within the range of CEO 
age where the relation between the length of the string and the probability of a stock price crash 
caused by a break is significant at the 5% level. Figure 3 displays the effect of the length of the 
string given CEO age (measured as deviations from the mean CEO age). The solid line shows 
the marginal effect of the length of the string while the dotted lines represent the 95% confidence 
intervals, with the conditional effect to be significant only when both confidence interval bounds 
lie either below or above zero. Thus, for Figure 3 the marginal effect of the length of the string is 
significant when CEO age is up to 3.55 standard deviations above the mean CEO age (or 
equivalently CEO age is below 81 years). For CEO age greater than 3.55 standard deviations 
above the mean CEO age, the effect is insignificant. These results nuance our previous 
interpretation.     
[Insert Table IV and  
Figures 2 & 3 about here] 
 
4.4 CEO COMPENSATION INCENTIVES AND CRASHES  
To investigate CEOs’ incentives to hide bad news we examine the evolution of CEO 
compensation before (up to 3 years), during, and after (up to 1 year) the incurrence of stock price 
                         
10
 Hoetker (2007) shows that not only the magnitude but also the sign of the interaction effect can change depending 
on the sign of independent variable coefficients and their coefficient estimates.  
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crashes. We focus on crashes triggered by revelation of bad news, as captured by 
CRASH_BREAK_STRING3, because this setting portrays the strongest relationship between 
strings of consecutive earnings increases and crashes. More specifically, we explore the 
determinants of CEO compensation using a regression of the natural logarithm of CEO 
compensation on various firm characteristics. Specifically, our main independent variable is the 
total CEO compensation (COMP). We also consider CEO salary (SALARY), bonus (BONUS), 
or equity-based components of compensation (OPTIONS). Firm characteristics include the 
natural logarithm of total assets (SIZEt), the number of years that the firm is covered in the 
COMPUSTAT universe (FIRM_AGEt), the ratio of market value of equity to book value of 
equity (MBt), the ratio of net income to total assets (ROAt), the cumulative monthly returns 
during the year (RETURNt), and the standard deviation of monthly returns during the year 
(STDEVt). In addition, we introduce a series of binary variables that denote individual years 
surrounding the crash year. In this respect, CRASH_YRt is the year that the crash occurred; 
BEF_CRASH_YRt-1 is the year before the crash; AFT_CRASH_YRt+1 is the year after the crash; 
and so forth. All regressions include year and industry binary variables, and standard errors are 
adjusted for clustering at the firm level. In this specification, the coefficient estimates of 
BEF_CRASH_YRt-3 – BEF_CRASH_YRt-1 represent the (yearly) effect of consecutive earnings 
increases on CEO compensation before the crash. Similarly, the coefficient estimate of 
CRASH_YRt represents the effect of a stock price crash on CEO compensation, and the estimate 
of AFT_CRASH_YRt+1 represents the effect on CEO compensation of the year after a stock 
price crash. 
The results in model 1 of Table V show that, controlling for the determinants of CEO 
compensation, consecutive earnings increases one and two years before the crash raise CEO total 
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compensation by 11.80% (p<0.01) and 7.80% (p<0.05), respectively. Interestingly, stock price 
crashes do not adversely affect CEO compensation because we do not find any statistically 
significant reductions. Similarly, the year after a stock price crash does not affect CEO 
compensation. Consequently, increases in CEO compensation during periods of consecutive 
earnings increases seem to be permanent because compensation does not revert to previous 
levels during both the year and the year after a firm experiences a stock price crash. This 
permanence creates strong financial incentives for CEOs to generate strings of consecutive 
earnings increases earlier in their careers.  
[Insert Table V about here] 
Next, we examine which components of CEO compensation drive the increase in 
compensation prior to a stock price crash. In models 2 to 4 of Table V, the dependent variable is 
the natural logarithm of salary, bonus and equity-based compensation, respectively. The results 
show that one year before the crash, strings of consecutive earnings increases are associated with 
sizeable increases of 9.50% (p<0.01) and 14.90% (p<0.01) in salary and equity-based 
compensation, respectively. In addition, two years before the crash, consecutive earnings 
increases relate to an increase of 6.10% (p<0.10) in salary and a significant increase of 13.70% 
(p<0.01) in bonus. Finally, as expected, bonus appears to fall during the crash year and the year 
after crash. Nevertheless, the increase in salary and equity-based compensation seems to be 
largely retained, and the decline in bonus does not affect total compensation in any economically 
meaningful fashion because the average CEO in the sample receives 50% of compensation in the 
form of equity-based compensation, 15% in salary, and only 8% in bonus. Overall, these results 
suggest that equity-based compensation and salary are the primary financial incentives that 
young CEOs pursue to hoard bad news and create strings of consecutive earnings increases.  
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4.5 THE MODERATING EFFECT OF MANAGERIAL DISCRETION  
In the previous section, we provide evidence that firms managed by younger CEOs are 
more likely to experience a stock price crash. This finding supports the view that financial 
incentives to hoard negative information, which vary across CEO age, create agency problems 
that drive stock price crashes. Agency theory identifies monitoring, among others, as a critical 
control system for such problems. Thus, we investigate whether an increase in managerial 
discretion, which suppresses the effectiveness of the monitoring, could moderate the relationship 
between CEO age and stock price crashes.  
The results in Table VI show coefficient estimates of the moderating effects of duality 
and Herfindahl index on the relationship between CEO age and stock price crashes. Similarly, 
Figures 4 and 5 plot the estimated moderating effect of duality and Herfindahl index on the 
relationship between the standardized values of CEO age and the likelihood of stock price 
crashes. Consistent with hypotheses 2 and 3, the results show that duality and degree of 
diversification increase the likelihood of firms managed by young than old CEOs to experience a 
stock price crash. Estimating the region of significance for the moderating effect of duality is 
meaningless because duality is a binary variable. Nevertheless, we can estimate the significance 
of the slope when duality equals one or zero, that is, for dual and non-dual CEOs. Untabulated 
results show that the slope is significant at the 1% level for dual CEOs and insignificant at 
conventional levels for non-dual CEOs. Regarding the region of significance of the moderating 
effect of Herfindahl index we estimate it using the Johnson-Neyman technique. Figure 6 plots 
the effect of CEO age given Herfindahl index. The figure shows that the marginal effect of CEO 
age is significant when the Herfindahl index is up to 0.60 standard deviations above the mean 
Herfindahl index (or equivalently Herfindahl index is below 0.97). For Herfindahl index greater 
27 
 
than 0.60 standard deviations above the mean, the effect is insignificant. Overall, these findings 
support the view that younger CEOs are more likely to exploit the CEO-Chair position and 
organizational complexity to hide bad news, thus increasing stock price crash risk.  
[Insert Table VI and  
Figures 4, 5 & 6 about here] 
 
5. Additional Analyses 
In this section, we perform several additional analyses to assess the robustness of the 
findings. First, thus far, a crash is defined to represent an extreme negative firm-specific weekly 
return. To alleviate concerns over the definition of extremeness, we re-run the main analysis 
using alternative measures of crash risk. In particular, we use as dependent variables either the 
negative coefficient of skewness (Chen et al., 2001) or extreme sigma (Bradshaw et al., 2010). 
The advantage of these variables is that they are continuous and they capture the proclivity of a 
firm toward stock price crashes; not necessarily, however, the more extreme ones. As shown in 
Table VII, the results from this analysis are qualitatively similar to those presented above.  
[Insert Table VII about here] 
Second, it is possible that inappropriate model specification of CEO tenure, which is 
correlated with CEO age, bias coefficient estimates of CEO age. Table VIII reports results after 
controlling for quadratic, cubic and quartic forms of tenure. The results show that the effect of 
CEO age on crashes and the moderating effect of duality/Herfindahl index remain robust; 
therefore, they are not driven by any non-linear effects of tenure.  
[Insert Table VIII about here] 
Third, if the characteristics of firms managed by younger CEOs are different, then the 
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apparent CEO age effect on stock price crashes might be biased when linear control variables 
employed in the main specification are inadequate. Under this assumption, the CEO age effect 
might pick up non-linear effects of the control variables on a firm’s propensity to experience a 
stock price crash. Ideally, to alleviate concerns over such functional form misspecification 
biases, we create two data samples that are comparable across all the control variables but differ 
only on CEO age. To construct these samples, we use a one-to-one propensity-score matching 
estimation method. More specifically, the method uses a probit regression to estimate propensity 
scores, p(Y=1|X=x), based on the probability of receiving a binary treatment, Y, conditional on 
all the control variables, x. To operationalize the estimation, we transform CEO age into a binary 
variable based on the median value of 55 (YOUNG_CEO) and we consider having a young CEO 
as treatment. Then, we estimate the propensity score of having a young CEO using the control 
variables, as in model 1 of Table III. We then use the resulting estimated propensity scores to 
find comparable firms that belong in the treatment effects and exhibit comparable scores. That is, 
for each firm-year with a young CEO we use the propensity scores to find comparable firm-years 
with an old CEO based on the nearest-neighbor method. To ensure the adequacy of the matching 
estimation method, we require that the absolute difference in propensity scores among pairs does 
not exceed 0.01. If there are more firm-years with an old CEO that meet this criterion, we retain 
the firm-year with the smallest difference in propensity scores. Using this method we obtain 
5,803 unique pairs of matched firm-years.  Panel A of Table IX displays the average of the 
control variables for young (below median age) and old (above median age) CEOs for both the 
unmatched and propensity-score matched samples. For the unmatched sample, it is evident that 
most of the control variables differ significantly across the two samples. For the propensity-score 
matched sample, however, all of the control variables are comparable across the two groups; by 
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design, only the CEO age differs.
11
 Using this sample, panel B of Table IX reports the results of 
the main analysis (in the spirit of models 1 and 3 of Table VI) using comparison samples for 
each treatment effect (e.g. young vs old CEOs). The results remain qualitatively similar, 
suggesting that the CEO age effect on stock price crashes is not an artifact of functional form 
misspecification biases.  
[Insert Table IX about here] 
Finally, the literature provides evidence that other variables measuring the severity of 
agency problems within a firm explain stock price crashes.
12
 Specifically, Hutton et al. (2009) 
find that opaque firms are more prone to stock price crashes. Kim et al. (2011a) find that the 
sensitivity of CEO and CFO option portfolios value-to-stock price relate positively to stock price 
crashes. Finally, Andreou et al. (2016) show that inefficient corporate governance, among others, 
dedicated (transient) institutional ownership relates negatively (positively) to stock price crashes. 
We re-run the main analysis after controlling for opacity, using the prior three years’ moving 
sum of the absolute value of discretionary accruals (OPACITYt-1), CEO and CFO incentive 
ratios for executive option and stock holdings (CEO_INC_OPTt-1, CFO_INC_OPTt-1, 
CEO_INC_STKt-1, CFO_INC_STKt-1), and dedicated and transient institutional ownership 
relative to total shares outstanding (DED_INST_HOLDINGSt-1 and TRA_INST_HOLDINGSt-1, 
respectively) as additional control variables.
13
 The results in Table X show that the main findings 
remain robust to the inclusion of these variables.  
[Insert Table X about here] 
 
                         
11
 An exception is the RETIREMENTt-1 variable that by definition should not vary across young and old CEOs.   
12
 Note that many of these variables, due to data availability, reduce the sample size substantially. Thus, rather than 
reporting the main analysis using a smaller sample size, we explicitly investigate the effect of these variables on our 
results in this section.    
13
 Information about institutional ownership classification into dedicated and transient investors is from Brian 
Bushee’s website. 
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6. Alternative Explanations 
In this section, we explore alternative explanations of our findings. First, whereas the 
theoretical arguments discussed in section 2 suggest a causal relationship running from younger 
CEOs to stock price crash risk, the evidence could also be consistent with alternative 
explanations that consider reverse causality; that is, stock price crash risk causes CEO firing and 
the firms hire younger CEOs thereafter. If this implication is true, then, assuming persistence in 
crash risk, our findings could be spurious and driven by this type of reverse causality. We 
explicitly investigate this explanation using various approaches. Initially, we compare the CEO 
age of newly hired CEOs for the sub-samples of firms that experience a stock price crash with 
those that do not. In Panel A of Table XI, there are 2,093 CEO turnovers; among them, 370 (or 
17.68%) coincide with a stock price crash and 1,723 (or 82.32%) do not. However, neither the 
mean nor the median age of newly hired CEOs is significantly different between the two sub-
samples, suggesting that reverse causality is unlikely to drive our findings. We also examine 
whether this type of reverse causality is more relevant as an explanation among firms that exhibit 
more difficulties in handling risk and/or firms that exhibit inherent riskiness. Such firms might 
be more prone to crash risk. At the same time, these firms might need a healthy, flexible and 
energetic young CEO that is able to deal with the stress of leadership. Accordingly, if these firms 
hire younger CEOs, then the CEO age effect could be an artifact of firm risk. To alleviate such 
concerns, we compare the mean/median age of newly hired CEOs for high-risk firms that 
experience a stock price crash with those that do not. In particularly, we focus on the sub-
samples of less experienced firms (e.g., below the median firm age), more competitive firms 
(e.g., above the median industry-adjusted firm operating profit to sales), and high default-risk 
firms (e.g., above the median probability of bankruptcy based on the Merton Distance-to-Default 
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model), which arguably represent riskier firms. The results in Panel A of Table XI show that the 
mean/median age of newly hired CEOs is not significantly different between risky firms that 
experience a stock price crash and risky firms that do not, implying that crash risk is not a 
determinant of the age of newly hired CEOs. As a complementary test of the reverse causality 
explanation, we also use multivariate regression analysis. Specifically, a prerequisite of the 
reverse causality explanation is that stock price crash risk shows persistence. Indeed, untabulated 
results reveal persistence in stock price crash risk that might prevail up to three years among the 
continuous measures of crash risk (i.e., the negative coefficient of skewness and the extreme 
sigma), rather than the binary indicator measure of crash risk. Accordingly, we re-run the main 
analysis after excluding the first three years of CEO tenure using (i) the full sample, and (ii) the 
sub-samples of riskier firms (i.e., less experienced firms, more-competitive firms and high 
default-risk firms). The results in Panels B, C, D and E of Table XI show that our main findings 
remain qualitatively similar.
14
  
[Insert Table XI about here] 
Second, we investigate whether our results could be explained with age-related 
physiological and psychological characteristics of the CEO and heterogeneous abilities that 
could provoke stock price crashes. Such characteristics include CEO demonstrated ability, 
power, risk tendency, youthful creativeness and inexperience in corporate communication. To 
rule out CEO demonstrated ability, power, and risk tendency as alternative explanations, we re-
run the main analysis after including explicit control variables. As a proxy for CEO 
demonstrated ability, we use the five-year historical industry-adjusted return on assets 
                         
14
 Note that among high-risk firms, the moderating effect of the Herfindahl index on the relationship between CEO 
age and stock price crashes is weak. This finding is not surprising because the Herfindahl index exhibits less 
variation among high-risk firms.  
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(IND_ADJ_ROAt-1) (Baik et al., 2011).
15
 Positive values can indicate that the CEO demonstrated 
greater ability to manage a firm more efficiently and generate greater profitability compared with 
industry rival firms. As a proxy for CEO power, following Bebchuk et al. (2011), we use the 
fraction of aggregate CEO compensation to the compensation of the top management team 
(CPSt-1). Greater values indicate the relative importance of the CEO compared with the top 
management team. We also control for a CEO risk tendency due to overconfidence 
(OVERCONFIDENCEt-1), one of the most prominent behavioral biases (Malmendier and Tate, 
2005), using the time-varying press-based measure from Andreou et al. (2016). The results in 
Table XII show that our main findings remain unaltered by the inclusion of these additional CEO 
characteristics. 
[Insert Table XII about here] 
Concerning youthful creativeness and inexperience with corporate communication, these 
CEO characteristics are more problematic to control directly because it is difficult to measure 
them precisely. Nevertheless, we can observe their consequences, which enable us to design 
appropriate tests to preclude them as alternative explanations of the CEO age effect. Specifically, 
the CEO age effect could result from (unsuccessful) youthful creativeness. Youthful 
creativeness, however, could also be successful and this would lead to positive jumps in 
performance. Accordingly, the CEO age should predict fat tails generally, not only one-sided 
exposure to crashes. To investigate whether youthful creativeness explains our findings, we 
define a positive jump symmetrically to a crash, that is, as a 3.2 standard deviation above the 
average firm-specific weekly returns for the entire fiscal year (JUMP), and repeat our main 
                         
15
 In an untabulated analysis, we also use alternative measures of CEO demonstrated ability. In particular, we use 
three-year and seven-year historical industry-adjusted returns on assets and the managerial ability measure of 
Demerjian et al. (2012). Including these measures into our regression analysis does not affect our findings.   
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analysis.
16
 Table XIII (Models 1 and 2) show no evidence of a relationship between CEO age 
and the probability of a positive jump. Thus, CEO age appears to predict only stock price 
crashes, and unsuccessful youthful creativeness is unlikely to explain this finding. 
Similarly, the CEO age effect could result from young CEOs’ lack of experience in 
corporate communication to set appropriate earnings expectations (Huang et al., 2012). This 
effect could motivate young CEOs to hoard bad news to meet or beat analyst earnings forecasts, 
thus increasing future stock price crash risk. Essentially, this explanation assumes that crashes 
that result from inexperience in corporate communication drive the CEO age effect. Accordingly, 
we redefine the binary crash risk variable after excluding these crashes (CRASH_EX_MB). 
These crashes are expected to coincide (i) with meeting or beating analyst earnings forecasts in 
the previous year and (ii) missed analyst earnings forecasts in the current year. Using this 
definition of crashes, we re-run the main analysis. The results in Table XIII (Models 3 and 4) 
remain qualitatively similar, suggesting that the CEO age effect is not explained by inappropriate 
earnings expectations.  
[Insert Table XIII about here] 
Finally, we also investigate the robustness of our results to potential unobserved CEO 
characteristic biases. Specifically, we examine whether the results are driven by habitual CEO 
characteristics, that is, characteristics stemming from innate abilities, social capital and 
personalities that remain constant over time (Graham et al., 2012). Such habitual CEO 
characteristics shape managerial style and might have implications for stock price crashes. Given 
the association of (extreme negative) stock performance with CEO dismissal, which presumably 
is greater for younger CEOs because they are less reputable, habitual CEO characteristics should 
affect disproportionately CEOs with different ages. As a result, if habitual CEO characteristics 
                         
16
 Within our sample, 2,883 firm-years or 15.45% are classified as jumps. 
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cause CEO dismissals due to stock price crashes, this will introduce a sample selection bias 
because younger CEOs are more likely to be dismissed (due to habitual CEO characteristics). 
This bias could induce a spurious relationship between CEO age and stock price crashes. To 
control for such potential unobserved CEO characteristic biases, we repeat our main analysis by 
considering the subsample of CEOs who keep their position for at least 5 years. In this respect, 
habitual CEO characteristics should affect the firm’s crash risk similarly over a long period, 
regardless of CEO age, which, by definition, varies over time. The results in Table XIV show 
that using this subsample of long-tenured CEOs, all of our conclusions remain qualitatively 
unaltered. 
[Insert Table XIV about here] 
 
7. Conclusions 
This study shows that younger CEOs are more likely to associate with future stock price 
crashes, including crashes resulting from breaks in strings of consecutive earnings increases. 
This evidence supports the idea that younger CEOs hide bad news relating to adverse operating 
performance, which subsequently triggers stock price crashes. In addition, this study finds that 
strings of consecutive earnings increases are accompanied by large permanent increases in CEO 
compensation that do not dissipate with crashes. Therefore, CEOs have financial incentives to 
hoard bad news earlier in their career, which subsequently leads to stock price crashes. Such 
crashes are more likely to occur when younger CEOs enjoy discretion, namely, when they hold a 
dual position or lead a diversified company. This finding suggests that younger CEOs exploit 
opportunities relating to (weak) corporate governance to promote their personal interests. 
Overall, this study suggests that CEO age is an important determinant of stock price crash risk 
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and expands our understanding concerning how CEO age becomes a source of an agency 
problem. 
Our findings have important implications for corporate governance and, more 
specifically, for the role of boards in selecting, monitoring and incentivizing CEOs. Boards 
should consider age when selecting a CEO to lead the company, when deciding about managerial 
discretion, and when devising monitoring mechanisms or incentivization schemes for CEOs 
(Carter and Lorsch, 2004).  
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Appendix: Definition of variables  
 
 
Variable Definition 
Main Dependent Variable:  
CRASH An indicator variable that equals 1 when a firm 
experiences at least 1 crash week during the fiscal 
year, and zero otherwise. 
CRASH_BREAK_STRING1 An indicator variable that equals 1 if a firm 
experiences a stock price crash and firm earnings 
decreased in the current year but increased in the 
previous year, and zero otherwise. 
CRASH_BREAK_STRING2 An indicator variable that equals 1 if a firm 
experiences a stock price crash and firm earnings 
decreased in the current year but increased in the 
previous 2 years, and zero otherwise. 
CRASH_BREAK_STRING3 An indicator variable that equals 1 if a firm 
experiences a stock price crash and firm earnings 
decreased in the current year but increased in the 
previous 3 years, and zero otherwise. 
COMP The value of total compensation that includes 
Salary, Bonus, Other Annual, Restricted Stock 
Grants, LTIP Payouts and Value of Option 
Grants. 
SALARY The value of base salary earned by the CEO 
during the fiscal year. 
BONUS The value of bonus earned by the CEO during the 
fiscal year. 
OPTIONS The value of equity-based components of 
compensation. 
NCSKEW The negative of the third moment of firm-specific 
weekly returns for each firm and year divided by 
the standard deviation of firm-specific weekly 
returns raised to the third power. 
EXTR_SIGMA The negative of the worst deviation of firm-
specific weekly returns from the average firm-
specific weekly return divided by the standard 
deviation of firm-specific weekly returns. 
JUMP An indicator variable that equals 1 when a firm 
experiences at least 1 jump week during the fiscal 
year, and zero otherwise. 
CRASH_EX_MB An binary variable that equals 1 when (i) a firm 
experiences at least 1 crash week during the fiscal 
year, and (ii) meet or beat analyst earnings 
forecasts in the previous fiscal year, and (iii) 
missed analyst earnings forecasts in the fiscal 
year, and zero otherwise. 
Main Explanatory variable:  
AGE The age of the CEO. 
DUALITY An indicator variable that equals 1 when the 
positions of the CEO and the chairman of the 
board are held by the same person, and zero 
otherwise. 
HERFINDAHL The sum for each year of the squared ratio of 
segment sales at the 4-digit SIC code level to firm 
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sales divided by the squared sum for each year of 
the ratio of segment sales at the 4-digit SIC code 
level to firm sales. Segment sales with the same 4-
digit SIC code are combined, whereas segment 
sales with missing SICs or with a description of 
“Corporate” are proportionately allocated to the 
remaining segments.  
  
Control Variable:  
TENURE The number of years in a CEO position with a 
particular company. 
CEO_CHANGE Dummy variable that equals 1 when there is a 
change in a firm’s CEO, and zero otherwise. 
RETIREMENT Dummy variable that equals 1 when the CEO is 
close to retirement (i.e., CEO age is 64–65 years). 
ITM_OPTIONS_HOLDINGS The intrinsic value of the vested and unvested in-
the-money options held by CEO. 
EQUITY_HOLDINGS The market value of shares held by CEO. 
SIZE The natural logarithm of total assets at fiscal year-
end.  
MB The ratio of market value to book value of equity. 
LEV The ratio of total liabilities to total assets. 
ROE The ratio of income before extraordinary items to 
equity.  
RETURN Average firm-specific weekly returns during the 
fiscal year. 
FIRM_AGE The number of years that the firm is covered in 
the COMPUSTAT universe. 
GOODWILL The ratio of goodwill to total assets. Missing 
values of goodwill are replaced with zero. 
R&D The ratio of research and development expenses 
to total assets. Missing values of research and 
development expenses are replaced with zero. 
TECHNOLOGY Dummy variable that equals 1 if the firm belongs 
to the following industries as defined by 4-digit 
SIC codes: 2833-2836, 3570-3577, 3600-3674, 
3810-3845, 7371-7379 and 8731-8734.  
COMPETITIVENESS The industry adjusted price-cost margin (PCM). 
PCM is defined as the ratio of firm operating 
profit to sales. Firm operating profit is calculated 
by subtracting from sales the cost of goods sold 
and the selling, general and administrative 
expenses.  
PR_DEFAULT The firm’s default risk estimated using the Merton 
(1974) probability-to-default model as in Andreou 
(2015). 
DTURN The detrended average weekly stock trading 
volume during the fiscal year. 
  
Other Variables:  
AGE_GROUP_ I An indicator variable that equals 1 if CEO’s age is 
less than 51, and zero otherwise. 
AGE_GROUP_II An indicator variable that equals 1 if CEO’s age is 
between 51 and 55, and zero otherwise. 
AGE_GROUP_III An indicator variable that equals 1 if CEO’s age is 
between 56 and 60, and zero otherwise. 
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AGE_GROUP_IV An indicator variable that equals 1 if CEO’s age is 
greater than 60, and zero otherwise. 
YOUNG_CEO An indicator variable that equals 1 if CEO’s age is 
less than 55, and zero otherwise. 
LEN_STRING The number of years the company displays 
consecutive increases in earnings, estimated from 
the time the CEO joins the company. 
STDEV the standard deviation of monthly returns during 
the fiscal year 
BEF_CRASH_YR An indicator variable that equals 1for the year 
before the crash, and zero otherwise. 
CRASH_YR An indicator variable that equals 1for the year of 
the crash, and zero otherwise. 
AFT_CRASH_YR An indicator variable that equals 1for the year 
after the crash, and zero otherwise. 
OPACITY Three-year moving sum of the absolute 
discretionary accruals estimated from a modified 
Jones (1991) model. 
CEO_INC_OPT The CEO Option holdings incentives ratio 
estimated as in Bergstresser and Philippon (2006). 
CEO_INC_STC The CEO Stock holdings incentives ratio 
estimated as in Bergstresser and Philippon (2006). 
CFO_INC_OPT The CFO Option holdings incentives ratio 
estimated as in Bergstresser and Philippon (2006). 
CFO_INC_STC The CFO Stock holdings incentives ratio 
estimated as in Bergstresser and Philippon (2006). 
DED_INST_HOLDINGS The ratio of the number of common shares held 
by dedicated institutional investors (as retrieved 
from Brian Bushee’s website) to the total shares 
outstanding of the firm.  
TRA_INST_HOLDINGS The ratio of the number of common shares held 
by transient institutional investors (as retrieved 
from Brian Bushee’s website) to the total shares 
outstanding of the firm. 
IND_ADJ_ROA The 5-year historical industry-adjusted return on 
assets. 
CPS The fraction of the aggregate CEO compensation 
to the compensation of the top management team. 
OVERCONFIDENCE The press-based measure of overconfidence from 
Andreou et al. (2016). 
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Figure 1 
 
Percentage of stock price crashes across CEO age quartiles 
 
This figure displays the percentage of stock price crashes across CEO age quartiles. For each age quartile, the 
percentage of stock price crashes is the number of firm-year crashes divided by the total number of firm-year 
observations in that quartile. 
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Figure 2 
 
Strings of consecutive earnings increases and crash risk: The moderating effect of CEO age 
 
This figure displays the estimated moderating effect of standardized values of CEO age on the relationship between 
the standardized values of the length of string of consecutive earnings increases and the likelihood of stock price 
crashes using model 6 of Table IV. The values of string of consecutive earnings increases range from low length of 
string (i.e., 1 standard deviation below the mean value) to high length of string (i.e., 1 standard deviation above the 
mean value) in the cases of both young (solid line) and old (dotted line) CEO age (i.e., 1 standard deviation above or 
below the mean, respectively).  
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Figure 3 
 
Johnson-Neyman region of significance for the conditional effect of the length of string of consecutive 
earnings increases given CEO age 
 
This figure displays the range of standard deviations below and above the mean CEO age where the relation 
between the length of the string and the probability of a stock price crash caused by a break using model 6 of Table 
IV is significant at 5% level.   
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Figure 4 
 
CEO age and crash risk: The moderating effect of duality  
 
This figure displays the estimated moderating effect of duality on the relationship between the standardized values 
of CEO age and the likelihood of stock price crashes using model 1 of Table VI. The likelihood of stock price 
crashes is evaluated for values of CEO age ranging from young CEO (i.e., 1 standard deviation below the mean 
value) to old CEO (i.e., 1 standard deviation above the mean value) in the cases of dual CEO, i.e., duality equals 1 
(solid line), and of non-dual CEO, i.e., duality equals 0 (dotted line).  
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Figure 5 
 
CEO age and crash risk: The moderating effect of the Herfindahl index  
 
This figure displays the estimated moderating effect of the Herfindahl index on the relationship between the 
standardized values of CEO age and the likelihood of stock price crashes using model 2 of Table VI. The likelihood 
of stock price crashes is evaluated for values of CEO age ranging from young CEO (i.e., 1 standard deviation below 
the mean value) to old CEO (i.e., 1 standard deviation above the mean value) in the cases of a low Herfindahl index. 
That is, the Herfindahl is set to 1 standard deviation below its mean value (solid line) and 1 standard deviation above 
its mean value (dotted line). 
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Figure 6 
 
Johnson-Neyman region of significance for the conditional effect of CEO age given Herfindahl index  
 
This figure displays the range of standard deviations below and above the mean Herfindahl index where the relation 
between the standardized values of CEO age and the probability of a stock price crash using model 2 of Table VI is 
significant at 5% level.   
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Table I 
 
Yearly incidence and magnitude of stock price crashes 
 
 
Year 
Number of 
observations 
Number of 
Crashes 
Percentage of 
crashes 
Average Returns 
during crashes 
Std of  Returns 
during crashes 
1995 886 142 16.03 -0.18 0.08 
1996 914 135 14.77 -0.20 0.09 
1997 946 135 14.27 -0.18 0.08 
1998 982 144 14.66 -0.22 0.08 
1999 1,016 182 17.91 -0.26 0.09 
2000 940 164 17.45 -0.29 0.10 
2001 897 155 17.28 -0.23 0.09 
2002 950 214 22.53 -0.23 0.11 
2003 963 170 17.65 -0.18 0.09 
2004 1,037 194 18.71 -0.16 0.07 
2005 973 237 24.36 -0.15 0.06 
2006 966 221 22.88 -0.14 0.05 
2007 994 177 17.81 -0.16 0.06 
2008 1,027 216 21.03 -0.22 0.08 
2009 1,050 179 17.05 -0.19 0.08 
2010 1,057 193 18.26 -0.14 0.06 
2011 1,049 215 20.50 -0.15 0.06 
2012 1,004 260 25.90 -0.15 0.07 
2013 998 240 24.05 -0.13 0.06 
Totals 18,649 3,573 19.16 -0.18 0.09 
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Table II 
 
Descriptive statistics 
 
This table presents descriptive statistics for key variables. All variables are defined in the Appendix. 
 
 Mean Std Q1 Median Q3 
CRASHt 0.192 0.394 0.000 0.000 0.000 
AGEt-1  55.041 7.376 50.000 55.000 60.000 
DUALITYt-1 0.578 0.494 0.000 1.000 1.000 
HERFINDAHLt-1 0.809 0.282 0.500 1.000 1.000 
TENUREt-1  7.975 7.470 2.752 5.659 10.669 
CEO_CHANGEt-1 0.110 0.312 0.000 0.000 0.000 
CEO_CHANGEt-2 0.103 0.304 0.000 0.000 0.000 
RETIREMENTt-1 0.040 0.197 0.000 0.000 0.000 
ITM_OPTIONS_HOLDINGSt-1 $MM 10.839 23.641 0.281 2.552 10.042 
EQUITY_HOLDINGSt-1 $MM 51.398 168.287 2.052 6.983 24.242 
SIZEt-1  7.185 1.526 6.057 7.011 8.164 
MBt -1 3.253 2.846 1.599 2.404 3.781 
LEVt-1 0.480 0.195 0.334 0.494 0.620 
ROEt-1 0.110 0.199 0.058 0.122 0.187 
RETURNt-1 -0.137 0.138 -0.170 -0.091 -0.049 
FIRM_AGEt-1 24.408 16.324 11.000 19.000 38.00 
GOODWILLt-1 0.111 0.138 0.000 0.055 0.182 
R&Dt-1 0.032 0.051 0.000 0.003 0.044 
TECHNOLOGY 0.217 0.412 0.000 0.000 0.000 
COMPETITIVENESSt-1 -0.053 0.201 -0.182 -0.026 0.065 
BANKRUPTCYt-1 0.004 0.029 0.000 0.000 0.000 
DTURNt-1 1.354 19.278 -5.888 0.652 7.762 
NCSKEWt-1 0.094 0.728 -0.336 0.042 0.449 
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Table III 
 
The impact of CEO age on stock price crashes 
 
This table reports the results of logit regressions where the dependent variable is the firm-specific stock 
price crash dummy (CRASH). Coefficients are reported as odds ratios. All models include a constant, 
year and industry fixed effects. Standard errors clustered at the firm level are shown in parentheses. *, 
**, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.  
 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Log(TENUREt-1)  
0.954
*
  
(0.024) 
0.976 
(0.026) 
0.976 
(0.025) 
0.965 
(0.025) 
CEO_CHANGEt-1 
1.206
***
 
(0.059) 
1.238
***
 
(0.059) 
1.252
***
 
(0.059) 
1.223
***
 
(0.059) 
CEO_CHANGEt-2 
1.237
***
 
(0.061) 
1.266
***
 
(0.061) 
1.278
***
 
(0.061) 
1.255
***
 
(0.061) 
RETIREMENTt-1 
1.102 
(0.094) 
1.193
*
 
(0.096) 
1.288
**
 
(0.100) 
1.148 
(0.095) 
Log(ITM_OPTIONS_HOLDINGSt-1) 
1.101
***
 
(0.023) 
1.095
***
 
(0.023) 
1.095
***
 
(0.023) 
1.098
***
 
(0.023) 
Log(EQUITY_HOLDINGSt-1) 
1.004 
(0.025) 
1.006 
(0.025) 
1.009 
(0.025) 
1.005 
(0.025) 
SIZEt-1 
0.877
***
 
(0.028) 
0.878
***
 
(0.028) 
0.875
***
 
(0.028) 
0.879
***
 
(0.028) 
MBt-1 
1.005 
(0.023) 
1.000 
(0.023) 
1.001 
(0.023) 
1.003 
(0.023) 
LEVt-1 
1.024 
(0.025) 
1.024 
(0.025) 
1.022 
(0.025) 
1.023 
(0.025) 
ROEt-1 
1.021 
(0.024) 
1.023 
(0.024) 
1.022 
(0.024) 
1.022 
(0.024) 
RETURNt-1 
1.047
*
 
(0.028) 
1.054
*
 
(0.028) 
1.051
*
 
(0.028) 
1.049
*
 
(0.028) 
Log(FIRM_AGEt-1) 
0.971 
(0.026) 
0.983 
(0.026) 
0.981 
(0.026) 
0.977 
(0.026) 
GOODWILLt-1 
1.072
***
 
(0.023) 
1.071
***
 
(0.023) 
1.070
***
 
(0.023) 
1.070
***
 
(0.023) 
R&Dt-1 
1.006 
(0.028) 
1.004 
(0.028) 
1.001 
(0.028) 
1.003 
(0.028) 
TECHNOLOGY 
1.104 
(0.073) 
1.100 
(0.073) 
1.104 
(0.072) 
1.102 
(0.073) 
COMPETITIVENESSt-1 
1.114
***
 
(0.031) 
1.113
***
 
(0.031) 
1.114
***
 
(0.031) 
1.113
***
 
(0.031) 
PR_DEFAULTt-1 
1.000 
(0.023) 
1.000 
(0.023) 
1.000 
(0.023) 
1.000 
(0.023) 
DTURNt -1 
1.049
**
 
(0.020) 
1.050
**
 
(0.020) 
1.050
**
 
(0.020) 
1.050
**
 
(0.020) 
NCSKEWt -1 
1.072
***
 
(0.020) 
1.070
***
 
(0.020) 
1.070
***
 
(0.020) 
1.071
***
 
(0.020) 
DUALITYt -1 
1.064 
(0.045) 
1.082
*
 
(0.045) 
1.084
*
 
(0.045) 
1.075 
(0.045) 
HERFINDAHLt-1 
1.035 
(0.023) 
1.032 
(0.023) 
1.033 
(0.023) 
1.033 
(0.023) 
Log(AGEt-1)  
0.924
***
 
(0.023) 
  
AGE_GROUP_I (<51)   
1.277
***
 
(0.064) 
 
AGE_GROUP_II (51-55)   
1.270
***
 
(0.066) 
 
AGE_GROUP_III (56-60)   
1.248
***
 
(0.059) 
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YOUNG_CEO    
1.112
**
 
(0.044) 
     
-2 Log likelihood 17,766.81 17,754.18 17,745.55 17,760.36 
Wald Chi-Square 383.7
***
 394.6
***
 405.9
***
 392.0
***
 
Max-rescaled R
2 
0.039 0.040 0.040 0.039 
Number of Observations 18,649 18,649 18,649 18,649 
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Table IV 
 
The impact of CEO age on stock price crashes: Crashes triggered by breaks in string of consecutive earnings increases 
 
This table reports the results of logit regressions where the dependent variable is firm-specific stock price crashes triggered by breaks in a firm’s string of consecutive 
earnings increases. Coefficients are reported as odds ratios. All models include a constant, control variables, year and industry fixed effects. Standard errors clustered at the 
firm level are shown in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.  
 
 CRASH_BREAK_STRING1 CRASH_BREAK_STRING2 CRASH_BREAK_STRING3 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Log(AGEt-1) 
0.892
***
 
(0.038) 
0.915
**
 
(0.038) 
0.919
*
 
(0.047) 
1.004 
(0.046) 
0.853
***
 
(0.061) 
1.019 
(0.062) 
LEN_STRINGt -1 
1.524
***
 
(0.031) 
1.554
***
 
(0.033) 
1.964
***
 
(0.041) 
2.052
***
 
(0.042) 
2.435
***
 
(0.055) 
2.603
***
 
(0.057) 
Log(AGEt-1) x LEN_STRINGt -1  
0.935
**
 
(0.027) 
 
0.878
***
 
(0.036) 
 
0.834
***
 
(0.049) 
-2 Log likelihood 7,221.75 7,216.43 5,099.43 5,083.85 3,092.55 3,072.65 
Wald Chi-Square 516.4
***
 520.1
***
 619.6
***
 641.6
***
 501.6
***
 536.0
***
 
Max-rescaled R
2 
0.093 0.094 0.147 0.150 0.212 0.218 
Number of Observations 16,251 16,251 16,251 16,251 16,251 16,251 
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Table V 
 
CEO compensation, earning strings and stock price crashes 
 
This table presents the results of OLS regressions where the dependent variables of models 1 to 4 are, 
respectively, the log of the CEO’s total compensation, salary, bonus, and equity-based compensation 
(equity-based compensation includes grants of options and restricted stock). All models include a 
constant, year and industry fixed effects. Standard errors clustered at the firm level are shown in 
parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.  
 
 Log(COMP) Log(SALARY) Log(BONUS) Log(OPTIONS) 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
SIZEt 
0.689
***
 
(37.13) 
0.604
***
 
(31.55) 
0.113
***
 
(8.94) 
0.507
***
 
(23.28) 
Log(FIRM_AGEt) 
0.001 
(0.06) 
0.121
***
 
(8.15) 
0.021
*
 
(1.83) 
-0.001 
(-0.40) 
MBt 
0.131
***
 
(7.35) 
-0.041
**
 
(-2.30) 
0.003 
(0.22) 
0.101
***
 
(5.08) 
ROAt 
0.032
***
 
(3.31) 
0.021
**
 
(2.21) 
0.095
***
 
(10.48) 
-0.003 
(-0.30) 
RETURNt 
0.030
***
 
(3.51) 
0.012 
(1.64) 
0.124
***
 
(15.85) 
0.017
*
 
(1.66) 
STDEVt 
0.044
***
 
(4.21) 
-0.020
*
 
(-1.82) 
-0.040
***
 
(4.08) 
0.037
***
 
(3.05) 
BEF_CRASH_YR t-3 
0.013 
(0.30) 
0.067
*
 
(1.72) 
0.102
**
 
(2.19) 
-0.026 
(-0.50) 
BEF_CRASH_YR t-2 
0.078
**
 
(1.97) 
0.061
*
 
(1.76) 
0.137
***
 
(3.35) 
0.077 
(1.64) 
BEF_CRASH_YR t-1 
0.118
***
 
(3.16) 
0.095
***
 
(2.68) 
0.010 
(0.25) 
0.149
***
 
(3.68) 
CRASH_YR t 
0.011 
(0.31) 
0.046 
(1.40) 
-0.177
***
 
(-4.46) 
0.045 
(1.10) 
AFT_CRASH_YR t+1 
-0.033 
(-0.94) 
0.011 
(0.31) 
-0.086
**
 
(-2.49) 
-0.001 
(-0.01) 
Adjusted R
2 
0.523 0.562 0.423 0.328 
Number of Observations 16,242 16,242 16,242 16,242 
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Table VI 
 
The impact of CEO age on stock price crashes: Moderating effects of CEO duality and 
Herfindahl index 
 
This table reports the results of logit regressions where the dependent variable is the firm-specific stock 
price crash dummy (CRASH). Coefficients are reported as odds ratios.  All models include a constant, 
control variables, year and industry fixed effects. Standard errors clustered at the firm level are shown 
in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.  
 
 
(1) (2) (3) 
DUALITYt-1 1.067 
(0.045) 
1.081
*
 
(0.045) 
1.068 
(0.045) 
HERFINDAHLt-1 1.033 
(0.023) 
1.026 
(0.023) 
1.027 
(0.023) 
Log(AGEt-1)  0.985 
(0.033) 
0.912
***
 
(0.023) 
0.966 
(0.033) 
Log(AGEt-1) x DUALITYt-1 0.899
**
 
(0.042) 
 
0.909
**
 
(0.042) 
Log(AGEt-1) x HERFINDAHLt-1  
1.072
***
 
(0.021) 
1.068
***
 
(0.021) 
-2 Log likelihood 17,747.00 17,743.10 17,737.39 
Wald Chi-Square 409.1
***
 406.0
***
 418.6
***
 
Max-rescaled R
2 
0.040 0.041 0.041 
Number of Observations 18,649 18,649 18,649 
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Table VII 
 
The impact of CEO age on stock price crashes: Alternative measures of crash risk 
 
This table presents the results of OLS regressions where the dependent variable of models 1 to 3 is the 
negative coefficient of skewness (NCSKEW) and the dependent variable of models 4 to 6 is the 
extreme sigma (EXTR_SIGMA). All models include a constant, control variables, year and industry 
fixed effects. Standard errors clustered at the firm level are shown in parentheses. *, **, and *** 
indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.  
 
 NCSKEW EXTR_SIGMA 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
DUALITYt-1 0.003  
(0.013) 
0.008  
(0.013) 
0.005  
(0.013) 
0.010  
(0.012) 
0.016  
(0.013) 
0.012  
(0.013) 
HERFINDAHLt-1 0.015
**
  
(0.006) 
0.015
**
  
(0.006) 
0.013
**
  
(0.006) 
0.015
**
  
(0.006) 
0.014
**
  
(0.006) 
0.013
**
  
(0.006) 
Log(AGEt-1)  
-0.025
***
  
(0.006) 
-0.011  
(0.009) 
 
-0.027
***
  
(0.006) 
-0.008  
(0.009) 
Log(AGEt-1) x DUALITYt-1   
-0.027
**
  
(0.012) 
  
-0.036
***
  
(0.012) 
LogAGEt-1) x HERFINDAHLt-1   
0.015
***
  
(0.006) 
  
0.014
**
  
(0.006) 
Adjusted R
2 
0.029 0.029 0.030 0.027 0.028 0.029 
Number of Observations 18,649 18,649 18,649 18,649 18,649 18,649 
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Table VIII 
 
The impact of CEO age on stock price crashes: Controls for non-linear effects of CEO tenure 
 
This table reports regression results where the dependent variable is a firm-specific stock price crash 
variable. The results of models 1 and 2 are odd ratios from logit regressions where the dependent 
variable is a crash risk dummy (CRASH). Models 3 to 6 report results of OLS regressions where the 
dependent variable of models 3 and 4 is the negative coefficient of skewness (NCSKEW) and the 
dependent variable of models 5 and 6 is the extreme sigma (EXTR_SIGMA). All models include a 
constant, control variables, year and industry fixed effects. Standard errors clustered at the firm level 
are shown in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, 
respectively.  
 
 CRASH NCSKEW EXTR_SIGMA 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Log(TENUREt-1) 
2.627 
(0.772) 
0.967 
(0.043) 
-0.003 
(0.013) 
-0.002 
(0.013) 
-0.006 
(0.012) 
-0.005 
(0.012) 
Log(TENUREt-1)
2
 
0.349 
(0.691) 
1.091
*
 
(0.045) 
0.001 
(0.013) 
0.001 
(0.013) 
0.006 
(0.012) 
0.006 
(0.012) 
Log(TENUREt-1)
3
 
1.501 
(0.249) 
1.008 
(0.016) 
0.002 
(0.004) 
0.002 
(0.004) 
0.002 
(0.004) 
0.002 
(0.004) 
Log(TENUREt-1)
4
 
0.950
*
 
(0.031) 
0.983 
(0.011) 
0.000 
(0.003) 
0.000 
(0.003) 
-0.001 
(0.003) 
-0.001 
(0.003) 
DUALITYt-1 
1.082
*
 
(0.045) 
1.069 
(0.045) 
0.008 
(0.013) 
0.006 
(0.013) 
0.016 
(0.013) 
0.013 
(0.013) 
HERFINDAHLt-1 
1.121 
(0.081) 
1.028 
(0.023) 
0.015
**
 
(0.006) 
0.013
**
 
(0.006) 
0.014
**
 
(0.006) 
0.013
**
 
(0.006) 
Log(AGEt-1) 
0.582
***
 
(0.171) 
0.976 
(0.033) 
-0.022
***
 
(0.006) 
-0.008 
(0.009) 
-
0.024
***
 
(0.006) 
-0.005 
(0.009) 
LogAGEt-1) x DUALITYt-1  
0.904
**
 
(0.042) 
 
-
0.027
**
 
(0.012) 
 
-
0.036
***
 
(0.012) 
Log(AGEt-1) x HERFINDAHLt-1  
1.065
***
 
(0.021) 
 
0.015
***
 
(0.006) 
 
0.013
**
 
(0.006) 
Max-rescaled  R
2
/Adjusted R
2 
0.040 0.041 0.029 0.030 0.028 0.029 
Number of Observations 18,649 18,649 18,649 18,649 18,649 18,649 
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Table IX 
 
The impact of CEO age on stock price crashes: Subsamples based on CEO age propensity scores 
 
Panel A presents the unmatched and matched covariate means of control variables for young and old CEOs. Panel A1 presents the unmatched sample (i.e. the original 
sample), and Panel A2 presents the matched sample based on CEO age propensity score matching. Panel B reports regression results where the dependent variable is a firm-
specific stock price crash variable. The results of models 1 and 2 are odd ratios from logit regressions where the dependent variable is a crash risk dummy (CRASH). Models 
3 to 6 report results of OLS regressions where the dependent variable of models 3 and 4 is the negative coefficient of skewness (NCSKEW) and the dependent variable of 
models 5 and 6 is the extreme sigma (EXTR_SIGMA). All models include a constant, control variables, year and industry fixed effects. Standard errors clustered at the firm 
level are shown in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.  
 
Panel A: Covariate means of control variables for young and old CEOs 
 
 A1.Unmatched A2.Matched 
 
YOUNG 
CEOs 
OLD 
CEOs 
Diff t-Stat 
YOUNG 
CEOs 
OLD 
CEOs 
Diff t-Stat 
DUALITYt-1 0.458 0.685 -0.226
***
 -31.940 0.664 0.651 0.013 1.470 
HERFINDAHLt-1 0.842 0.779 0.062
***
 15.260 0.792 0.790 0.002 0.330 
Log(TENUREt-1)  1.684 2.088 -0.404
***
 -37.020 1.977 1.998 -0.021 -1.600 
CEO_CHANGEt-1 0.071 0.144 -0.073
***
 -16.350 0.119 0.109 0.010 1.650 
CEO_CHANGEt-2 0.074 0.130 -0.056
***
 -12.780 0.114 0.111 0.003 0.530 
RETIREMENTt-1 0.000 0.077 -0.077
***
 -28.560 0.000 0.071 -0.071
***
 -21.110 
Log(ITM_OPTIONS_HOLDINGSt-1) 6.794 6.755 0.040 0.780 6.820 6.874 -0.054 -0.840 
Log(EQUITY_HOLDINGSt-1) 8.391 9.096 -0.705
***
 -21.120 9.037 8.983 0.054 1.370 
SIZEt-1 6.978 7.371 -0.393
***
 -17.780 7.345 7.330 0.015 0.530 
MBt-1 3.408 3.114 0.295
***
 7.010 3.074 3.132 -0.059 -1.200 
LEVt-1 0.467 0.493 -0.026
***
 -9.060 0.491 0.490 0.001 0.340 
ROEt-1 0.098 0.120 -0.022
***
 -7.430 0.117 0.118 -0.002 -0.480 
RETURNt-1 -0.155 -0.121 -0.034
***
 -16.680 -0.125 -0.124 -0.001 -0.270 
Log(FIRM_AGEt-1) 2.852 3.132 -0.281
***
 -26.940 3.080 3.096 -0.016 -1.230 
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GOODWILLt-1 0.112 0.111 0.001 0.380 0.112 0.112 0.000 -0.130 
R&Dt-1 0.038 0.027 0.011
***
 14.560 0.026 0.028 -0.001
*
 -1.790 
TECHNOLOGY 0.253 0.185 0.068
***
 11.180 0.188 0.193 -0.005 -0.690 
COMPETITIVENESSt-1 -0.046 -0.059 0.013
***
 4.340 -0.054 -0.055 0.001 0.360 
PR_DEFAULTt-1 0.005 0.004 0.001
***
 2.840 0.004 0.004 0.000 0.470 
DTURNt-1 1.475 1.245 0.230 0.800 1.204 1.154 0.051 0.150 
NCSKEWt-1 0.113 0.078 0.034
***
 3.230 0.101 0.087 0.014 1.030 
N 8,826 9,823   5,803 5,803   
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Panel B: The impact of CEO age on stock price crashes: Matched sample using CEO age propensity scores 
 
 CRASH NCSKEW EXTR_SIGMA 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
DUALITYt-1 
1.077 
(0.052) 
1.073 
(0.052) 
0.024 
(0.015) 
0.022 
(0.015) 
0.023 
(0.015) 
0.022 
(0.015) 
HERFINDAHLt-1 
1.033 
(0.027) 
1.034 
(0.027) 
0.020
***
 
(0.008) 
0.020
**
 
(0.008) 
0.013
*
 
(0.007) 
0.013
*
 
(0.007) 
Log(AGEt-1) 
0.929
***
 
(0.024) 
0.940 
(0.042) 
-0.018
***
 
(0.007) 
0.001 
(0.012) 
-0.028
***
 
(0.007) 
-0.007 
(0.011) 
Log(AGEt-1) x DUALITYt-1  
0.968 
(0.050) 
 
-0.032
**
 
(0.014) 
 
-0.033
**
 
(0.014) 
Log(AGEt-1) x HERFINDAHLt-1  
1.061
**
 
(0.025) 
 
0.020
***
 
(0.007) 
 
0.019
***
 
(0.007) 
Max-rescaled R
2
/Adjusted R
2 
0.037 0.038 0.030 0.031 0.025 0.026 
Number of Observations 11,606 11,606 11,606 11,606 11,606 11,606 
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Table X 
 
The impact of CEO age on stock price crashes: Additional control variables 
 
This table reports regression results where the dependent variable is a firm-specific stock price crash variable. The results of models 1 and 2 are odd ratios from logit 
regressions where the dependent variable is a crash risk dummy (CRASH). Models 3 to 6 report results of OLS regressions where the dependent variable of models 3 and 4 is 
the negative coefficient of skewness (NCSKEW) and the dependent variable of models 5 and 6 is the extreme sigma (EXTR_SIGMA). All models include a constant, control 
variables, year and industry fixed effects. Standard errors clustered at the firm level are shown in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% 
levels, respectively.  
 
 CRASH NCSKEW EXTR_SIGMA 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
OPACITYt-1 1.019 
(0.025) 
1.019 
(0.025) 
0.010 
(0.008) 
0.010 
(0.008) 
0.011 
(0.007) 
0.011 
(0.007) 
CEO_INC_OPTt-1 0.950 
(0.039) 
0.952 
(0.039) 
-0.023
*
 
(0.012) 
-0.022
*
 
(0.012) 
-0.003 
(0.011) 
-0.002 
(0.011) 
CFO_INC_OPTt-1 1.030 
(0.032) 
1.029 
(0.032) 
0.017
*
 
(0.010) 
0.017
*
 
(0.010) 
0.002 
(0.009) 
0.001 
(0.009) 
CEO_INC_STCt-1 1.053 
(0.036) 
1.057 
(0.036) 
0.016 
(0.012) 
0.017 
(0.012) 
0.015 
(0.011) 
0.016 
(0.011) 
CFO_INC_STCt-1 0.969 
(0.025) 
0.969 
(0.025) 
-0.005 
(0.007) 
-0.005 
(0.007) 
-0.005 
(0.007) 
-0.005 
(0.007) 
DED_INST_HOLDINGSt-1 0.989 
(0.034) 
0.988 
(0.034) 
-0.001 
(0.009) 
-0.001 
(0.009) 
-0.007 
(0.009) 
-0.007 
(0.009) 
TRA_INST_HOLDINGSt-1 1.127
***
 
(0.027) 
1.127
***
 
(0.027) 
0.055
***
 
(0.009) 
0.055
***
 
(0.009) 
0.045
***
 
(0.008) 
0.045
***
 
(0.008) 
DUALITYt-1 
1.065 
(0.053) 
1.048 
(0.053) 
0.001 
(0.015) 
-0.001 
(0.015) 
0.008 
(0.015) 
0.005 
(0.015) 
HERFINDAHLt-1 
1.057
**
 
(0.026) 
1.054
**
 
(0.026) 
0.024
***
 
(0.007) 
0.022
***
 
(0.007) 
0.024
***
 
(0.007) 
0.023
***
 
(0.007) 
Log(AGEt-1) 
0.919
***
 
(0.027) 
0.969 
(0.038) 
-0.024
***
 
(0.008) 
-0.016 
(0.011) 
-0.028
***
 
(0.008) 
-0.013 
(0.011) 
Log(AGEt-1) x DUALITYt-1  
0.900
**
 
(0.047) 
 
-0.018 
(0.014) 
 
-0.028
**
 
(0.014) 
62 
 
LogAGEt-1) x HERFINDAHLt-1  
1.061
**
 
(0.024) 
 
0.018
***
 
(0.007) 
 
0.014
**
 
(0.007) 
Max-rescaled R
2
 /Adjusted R
2 
0.042 0.044 0.031 0.031 0.029 0.030 
Number of Observations 13,265 13,265 13,265 13,265 13,265 13,265 
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Table XI 
 
The impact of CEO age on stock price crashes: Endogeneity tests 
 
Panel A presents univariate analysis of the age of newly hired CEOs of firms that exhibit a stock price crash relative to firms that do not. Panels B, C, D and E report 
regression results where the dependent variable is a firm-specific stock price crash variable after excluding the first 3 years of CEO tenure for the whole sample, for firms 
below median value of firm age, for firms with above median competitiveness and for firms with above median probability of default respectively. The results of models 1 
and 2 are odd ratios from logit regressions where the dependent variable is a crash risk dummy (CRASH). Models 3 to 6 report results of OLS regressions where the 
dependent variable of models 3 and 4 is the negative coefficient of skewness (NCSKEW) and the dependent variable of models 5 and 6 is the extreme sigma 
(EXTR_SIGMA). All models include a constant, control variables, year and industry fixed effects. Standard errors clustered at the firm level are shown in parentheses. *, **, 
and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.  
 
Panel A: Univariate analysis  
 
 Full Sample Risky Firms 
 
Age of newly hired 
CEOs 
Low Firm Age Competitive Firms 
High Probability of 
Default 
CRASH 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 
Mean 52.13 52.29 51.14 51.34 51.98 51.70 52.12 52.35 
Diff  0.16  0.20  -0.28  0.23 
t-stat  0.40  0.34  -0.48  0.41 
Median 52 52 51 51 52 52 52 52 
Diff  0  0  0  0 
z-stat  0.71  0.15  0.65  0.34 
N 1,723 370 772 190 808 173 899 193 
 
Panel B: Analysis after excluding the first 3 years of CEO tenure  
 
 CRASH NCSKEW EXTR_SIGMA 
Name Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
DUALITYt-1 
1.078 
(0.050) 
1.060 
(0.050) 
0.006 
(0.014) 
0.002 
(0.014) 
0.014 
(0.014) 
0.009 
(0.014) 
HERFINDAHLt-1 1.016 1.011 0.012
*
 0.010 0.011
*
 0.010 
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(0.025) (0.025) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) 
Log(AGEt-1) 
0.899
***
 
(0.026) 
0.937
*
 
(0.038) 
-0.029
***
 
(0.007) 
-0.016 
(0.010) 
-0.037
***
 
(0.007) 
-0.018
*
 
(0.011) 
Log(AGEt-1) x DUALITYt-1  
0.921
*
 
(0.046) 
 
-0.025
*
 
(0.013) 
 
-0.032
**
 
(0.013) 
Log(AGEt-1) x HERFINDAHLt-1  
1.065
***
 
(0.023) 
 
0.016
**
 
(0.006) 
 
0.014
**
 
(0.006) 
Max-rescaled  R
2
/Adjusted R
2 
0.043 0.045 0.030 0.031 0.030 0.030 
Number of Observations 15,258 15,258 15,258 15,258 15,258 15,258 
 
Panel C: Analysis after excluding the first 3 years of CEO tenure for firms below median value of firm age 
 
 CRASH NCSKEW EXTR_SIGMA 
Name Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
DUALITYt-1 
1.069 
(0.064) 
1.059 
(0.064) 
0.006 
(0.019) 
0.003 
(0.019) 
0.018 
(0.019) 
0.014 
(0.019) 
HERFINDAHLt-1 
1.025 
(0.032) 
1.022 
(0.033) 
0.015
*
 
(0.009) 
0.015 
(0.009) 
0.012 
(0.009) 
0.012 
(0.009) 
Log(AGEt-1) 
0.926
**
 
(0.033) 
0.982 
(0.050) 
-0.026
***
 
(0.010) 
-0.001 
(0.014) 
-0.028
***
 
(0.010) 
0.004 
(0.014) 
Log(AGEt-1) x DUALITYt-1  
0.908 
(0.061) 
 
-0.040
**
 
(0.017) 
 
-0.053
***
 
(0.018) 
Log(AGEt-1) x HERFINDAHLt-1  
1.033 
(0.031) 
 
0.006 
(0.009) 
 
0.007 
(0.009) 
`Max-rescaled  R
2
/Adjusted R
2 
0.046 0.047 0.032 0.032 0.029 0.030 
Number of Observations 7,852 7,852 7,852 7,852 7,852 7,852 
 
Panel D: Analysis after excluding the first 3 years of CEO tenure for firms with above median competitiveness 
 
 CRASH NCSKEW EXTR_SIGMA 
Name Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
DUALITYt-1 
1.092 
(0.071) 
1.065 
(0.071) 
0.010 
(0.019) 
0.003 
(0.018) 
0.016 
(0.019) 
0.009 
(0.019) 
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HERFINDAHLt-1 
1.034 
(0.035) 
1.033 
(0.035) 
0.017
*
 
(0.009) 
0.015
*
 
(0.009) 
0.012 
(0.009) 
0.011 
(0.009) 
Log(AGEt-1) 
0.882
***
 
(0.035) 
0.954 
(0.056) 
-0.033
***
 
(0.009) 
-0.001 
(0.014) 
-0.039
***
 
(0.009) 
-0.008 
(0.015) 
Log(AGEt-1) x DUALITYt-1  
0.878
*
 
(0.068) 
 
-0.052
***
 
(0.017) 
 
-0.051
***
 
(0.018) 
Log(AGEt-1) x HERFINDAHLt-1  
1.039 
(0.034) 
 
0.015
*
 
(0.008) 
 
0.013 
(0.008) 
Max-rescaled  R
2
/Adjusted R
2 
0.058 0.059 0.035 0.036 0.035 0.036 
Number of Observations 7,679 7,679 7,679 7,679 7,679 7,679 
 
Panel E: Analysis after excluding the first 3 years of CEO tenure for firms with above median probability of default 
 
 CRASH NCSKEW EXTR_SIGMA 
Name Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
DUALITYt-1 
1.184
**
 
(0.074) 
1.163
**
 
(0.075) 
0.013 
(0.021) 
0.008 
(0.021) 
0.033 
(0.020) 
0.029 
(0.020) 
HERFINDAHLt-1 
1.034 
(0.035) 
1.031 
(0.035) 
0.008 
(0.010) 
0.006 
(0.010) 
0.011 
(0.009) 
0.011 
(0.010) 
Log(AGEt-1) 
0.880
***
 
(0.035) 
0.915
*
 
(0.053) 
-0.037
***
 
(0.010) 
-0.019 
(0.015) 
-0.046
***
 
(0.010) 
-0.027
*
 
(0.015) 
Log(AGEt-1) x DUALITYt-1  
0.930 
(0.064) 
 
-0.030 
(0.018) 
 
-0.030
*
 
(0.018) 
Log(AGEt-1) x HERFINDAHLt-1  
1.052 
(0.032) 
 
0.019
**
 
(0.009) 
 
0.006 
(0.009) 
Max-rescaled  R
2
/Adjusted R
2
 0.063 0.063 0.042 0.043 0.036 0.036 
Number of Observations 7,508 7,508 7,508 7,508 7,508 7,508 
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Table XII 
 
The impact of CEO age on stock price crashes: Controls for heterogeneous CEO abilities  
 
This table reports regression results where the dependent variable is a firm-specific stock price crash variable. The results of models 1 and 2 are odd ratios from logit 
regressions where the dependent variable is a crash risk dummy (CRASH). Models 3 to 6 report results of OLS regressions where the dependent variable of models 3 and 4 is 
the negative coefficient of skewness (NCSKEW) and the dependent variable of models 5 and 6 is the extreme sigma (EXTR_SIGMA). All models include a constant, control 
variables, year and industry fixed effects. Standard errors clustered at the firm level are shown in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% 
levels, respectively.  
 
 CRASH NCSKEW EXTR_SIGMA 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
IND_ADJ_ROAt-1 
1.067
*
 
(0.033) 
1.065
*
 
(0.034) 
-0.002 
(0.011) 
-0.002 
(0.011) 
0.013 
(0.010) 
0.012 
(0.010) 
OVERCONFIDENCEt-1 
0.992 
(0.077) 
0.992 
(0.077) 
-0.032 
(0.021) 
-0.032 
(0.021) 
-0.015 
(0.021) 
-0.015 
(0.021) 
CPS t -1 
1.061
**
 
(0.025) 
1.062
**
 
(0.025) 
0.019
**
 
(0.007) 
0.019
**
 
(0.007) 
0.018
**
 
(0.007) 
0.018
**
 
(0.007) 
DUALITYt-1 
1.084 
(0.056) 
1.065 
(0.056) 
0.004 
(0.015) 
0.001 
(0.015) 
0.018 
(0.015) 
0.013 
(0.015) 
HERFINDAHLt-1 
1.018 
(0.028) 
1.013 
(0.028) 
0.018
**
 
(0.007) 
0.015
**
 
(0.008) 
0.016
**
 
(0.007) 
0.014
*
 
(0.007) 
Log(AGEt-1) 
0.928
***
 
(0.028) 
0.977 
(0.040) 
-0.018
**
 
(0.008) 
-0.006 
(0.011) 
-0.023
***
 
(0.008) 
-0.004 
(0.011) 
Log(AGEt-1) x DUALITYt-1  
0.901
**
 
(0.049) 
 
-0.024
*
 
(0.014) 
 
-0.034
**
 
(0.014) 
Log(AGEt-1) x HERFINDAHLt-1  
1.084
***
 
(0.025) 
 
0.022
***
 
(0.007) 
 
0.018
***
 
(0.007) 
Max-rescaled  R
2
/Adjusted R
2 
0.038 0.040 0.030 0.031 0.025 0.026 
Number of Observations 12,571 12,571 12,571 12,571 12,571 12,571 
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Table XIII 
 
The impact of CEO age on positive stock price jumps and stock price crashes (excluding crashes 
that likely result from inappropriate earnings expectations) 
 
 
This table reports the results of logit regressions where the dependent variable in models 1 and 2 is 
positive stock price jumps and in models 3 and 4 is the firm-specific stock price crash, excluding 
crashes that likely result from inappropriate earnings expectations. Coefficients are reported as odds 
ratios. All models include a constant, control variables, year and industry fixed effects. Standard errors 
clustered at the firm level are shown in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 
5%, and 1% levels, respectively.  
 
 JUMP CRASH_EX_MB 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
DUALITYt-1 
1.060 
(0.048) 
1.061 
(0.048) 
1.046 
(0.052) 
1.037 
(0.051) 
HERFINDAHLt-1 
0.993 
(0.024) 
0.997 
(0.024) 
1.010 
(0.026) 
1.006 
(0.025) 
Log(AGEt-1) 
1.007 
(0.024) 
1.011 
(0.035) 
0.930
***
 
(0.025) 
0.959 
(0.037) 
Log(AGEt-1) x DUALITYt-1 
 0.999 
(0.044) 
 0.926 
(0.047) 
Log(AGEt-1) x HERFINDAHLt-1 
 0.972 
(0.023) 
 1.067
***
 
(0.024) 
Max-rescaled R
2 
0.039 0.040 0.037 0.038 
Number of Observations 18,649 18,649 15,254 15,254 
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Table XIV 
 
The impact of CEO age on stock price crashes: Subsample of CEOs stayed with a firm for at 
least 5 years 
 
This table reports regression results where the dependent variable is a firm-specific stock price crash 
variable. The results of models 1 and 2 are odd ratios from logit regressions where the dependent 
variable is a crash risk dummy (CRASH). Models 3 to 6 report results of OLS regressions where the 
dependent variable of models 3 and 4 is the negative coefficient of skewness (NCSKEW) and the 
dependent variable of models 5 and 6 is the extreme sigma (EXTR_SIGMA). All models include a 
constant, control variables, year and industry fixed effects. Standard errors clustered at the firm level 
are shown in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, 
respectively.   
 
 CRASH NCSKEW EXTR_SIGMA 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
DUALITYt-1 
1.077 
(0.049) 
1.062 
(0.049) 
0.003 
(0.013) 
-0.001 
(0.013) 
0.011 
(0.013) 
0.007 
(0.013) 
HERFINDAHLt-1 
1.021 
(0.025) 
1.015 
(0.025) 
0.016
**
 
(0.007) 
0.014
**
 
(0.007) 
0.015
**
 
(0.007) 
0.014
**
 
(0.007) 
Log(AGEt-1) 
0.912
***
 
(0.026) 
0.950 
(0.039) 
-0.026
***
 
(0.007) 
-0.011 
(0.010) 
-0.030
***
 
(0.007) 
-0.011 
(0.010) 
Log(AGEt-1) x DUALITYt-1  
0.919
*
 
(0.047) 
 
-0.027
**
 
(0.013) 
 
-0.033
***
 
(0.013) 
Log(AGEt-1) x HERFINDAHLt-1  
1.062
**
 
(0.024) 
 
0.012
*
 
(0.006) 
 
0.010 
(0.006) 
Max-rescaled  R
2
/Adjusted R
2 
0.040 0.041 0.030 0.030 0.028 0.029 
Number of Observations 15,956 15,956 15,956 15,956 15,956 15,956 
 
 
